Evidence
Every source cited on this site, strongest evidence first.
Randomised controlled trials
Becker et al. (METR), arXiv 2025
LoopingMeasuringReviewingUnderstandingDelivery
Experienced developers forecast they would be 24% faster with AI but were measured 19% slower (16 developers, 246 tasks on familiar repos, Claude 3.5/3.7).
Used in
- Track agent outcomes on novel versus boilerplate work trial
- Measure time to an accepted change, not lines or PRs recommendation
- Time real tasks instead of trusting forecasts or surveys recommendation
- Don't judge learning by self-report recommendation
Shen & Tamkin, Anthropic 2026
Understanding
In a vendor RCT (n=52, unreplicated), AI help gave quiz scores of 50% vs 67% (d=0.74), the biggest gap in debugging and no significant speed gain; in exploratory subgroups of 2 to 7 people, conceptual questions scored 65% or more and delegating under 40%.
Used in
- Ask the AI, don't delegate to it, while building a skill recommendation
Studies
Rein (METR), Algorithmic vs. holistic evaluation, 2025
LoopingTestingMeasuringReviewingDeliverySpecification
An agent passed 38% of maintainer test suites, but 0 of 15 reviewed PRs were mergeable, including 4 that passed every test (Claude 3.7).
Used in
- Keep an accountable human review on AI changes recommendation
- Keep a human upstream of what tests assert recommendation
- Don't treat a passing suite or a green loop as done recommendation
Bean et al., NeurIPS 2025
Measuring
Of 445 LLM benchmarks, 16.0% used any statistical test or uncertainty estimate to compare models, 53.4% gave evidence that they measure what they claim, and under 10% used complete real-world tasks.
Used in
Stanford HAI, AI Index report, 2026
MeasuringTesting
Secondary synthesis: invalid benchmark questions ranged from 2% (MMLU Math) to 42% (GSM8K).
Used in
- Grade agents on tests they never saw recommendation
Peng et al., arXiv 2023
MeasuringDelivery
Developers were 55.8% faster on one greenfield task, counting only the 35 of 95 who finished; GitHub and Microsoft authors.
Used in
- Measure time to an accepted change, not lines or PRs recommendation
- Don't decide on vendor-reported figures recommendation
Imai, ICSE 2022 poster
MeasuringTeamwork
Pearce et al., IEEE S&P 2022
MeasuringSecurityReviewing
About 40% of completions for risky scenarios were vulnerable.
Used in
- Give security-sensitive changes a human review recommendation
Tabarsi et al., Empirical Software Engineering 2026
MeasuringSpecificationReviewing
Of 16 early adopters interviewed, 14 reported less mundane work and 13 saved time, yet 8 discarded most generated code and 15 modified code before using it.
Ma et al., NeurIPS 2025
MeasuringTesting
Lulla et al., ICSE workshop 2026
Specification
A short AGENTS.md cut median time 28.6% and output tokens 16.6% with gpt-5.2-codex; correctness was not measured.
Used in
- Write context files by hand and keep them short recommendation
- Every line in the context file costs money challenge
Shim et al., ICLR 2026
Specification
Performance peaked well below full context, so more context can be worse (GPT-4o, Qwen 2.5).
Used in
- Keep context lean recommendation
- Compare whole-module context with retrieval trial
Paulsen, arXiv 2025
Specification
Retrieval degraded with length: most models degraded severely by 1,000 tokens.
Used in
- Keep context lean recommendation
- Compare whole-module context with retrieval trial
Galster et al., AIware 2026
Specification
In 2,853 engineered GitHub repositories, 90.6% had a context file (CLAUDE.md in 45.9% and AGENTS.md in 39.5% of those), skills and subagents were rare and mostly static text, and 301 of 497 context-file pointer pairs pointed from CLAUDE.md to AGENTS.md; this measures adoption, not benefit.
Used in
Paltenghi & Chandra, arXiv 2026
Specification
A spec recovered from a finished session let a fresh agent rebuild the change at a mean 5.06 of 6 on 72 internal Meta tasks (5.74 after up to three refinement rounds) against 4.23 for the developer's own change description, with specs about 5.7 times shorter than the diff; LLM graders, internal data.
Used in
Rathje et al., preprint 2026
SpecificationUnderstandingMeasuring
Users rated sycophantic bots as more objective, and 72% of real ChatGPT turns were as agreeable as the sycophantic condition.
Used in
- Don't judge learning by self-report recommendation
- Agreeable answers mislead without being wrong challenge
Kassner & Schütze, ACL 2020
Specification
Negations prime the concept they ask the model to avoid (BERT).
Used in
Min et al., EMNLP 2022
Specification
Format and coverage of few-shot examples matter more than correct labels (GPT-3 era).
Used in
Margalit et al., arXiv 2026
SpecificationSecurityUnderstanding
An automated contradiction detector superseded 90 of 90 admitted conflicting facts in one service.
Kohler (NN/g), The 3 roles of context for AI agents, 2026
Specification
A qualitative study with Claude power users proposes asking whether each context item is global (rarely changes), local (one task) or ambient (raw streams).
Used in
Moran & Gibbons (NN/g), Vibe architects, 2026
Specification
The sample behind the big-ball-of-mud observation is 7 people.
Used in
Demirer et al., NBER 2026
ReviewingMeasuringDelivery
Across 100,000+ developers, AI tools raised lines of code 17.3x and releases only 1.3x; calibrated on this data, unlimited code generation would lift releases only about 10% (a calibration, not an estimate).
Used in
- Keep an accountable human review on AI changes recommendation
- Keep user focus recommendation
Perry et al., CCS 2023
ReviewingSecurityTestingUnderstandingMeasuring
AI-assisted participants (n=47) wrote less secure code on 4 of 5 security tasks and were more likely to believe it was secure.
Used in
- Keep an accountable human review on AI changes recommendation
- Give security-sensitive changes a human review recommendation
- Compare defects by provenance trial
- Don't read confidence in AI-assisted code as security recommendation
He et al., via Ehsani et al., arXiv 2026
ReviewingMeasuringSecurityTesting
Baltes et al., arXiv 2026
ReviewingSecurityMeasuringTestingTeamwork
Vicente & Matute, via Lovett, arXiv 2026
ReviewingUnderstanding
80.7% of participants spotted a flawed AI recommendation and followed it anyway.
Used in
Councilman et al., arXiv 2025
ReviewingTesting
Ye, Cui & Hadfield-Menell, ICML 2026
SecuritySpecification
Models judge who is speaking by writing style, not role tags; forged reasoning raised attack success from about 0% to 60%.
Used in
- Enforce access and approvals outside the model recommendation
- Don't rely on delimiting untrusted content as the defence recommendation
Spracklen et al., USENIX Security 2025
Security
At least 5.2% of packages suggested by commercial models and 21.7% by open-source models didn't exist, about 45% of fake names recurred every time, and checking names against the registry is 'the illusion of verification' once an attacker registers the name.
Used in
- Verify a package's publisher and registration date recommendation
- Log and flag every package agents add trial
- Don't accept new dependencies an agent adds unchecked recommendation
Krishna et al., arXiv 2025
Security
Across 11 code models, package hallucination ranged from 0.22% to 46.15% per model and language (5.42% for GPT-4o); larger, higher-scoring models invented fewer packages, a directional result driven partly by two outliers (three of four authors at NVIDIA, whose model scored best).
Used in
- Verify a package's publisher and registration date recommendation
- Don't treat a stronger model as a security control recommendation
- Don't accept new dependencies an agent adds unchecked recommendation
Geng et al., CMC 2026
Security
A review of 128 studies claims an input filter plus output validation plus model-level defences brings attack success under 5%, but the section it points to reports no measurement.
Fucci et al., IEEE TSE 2017
TestingDelivery
In a pre-LLM study of 39 professionals, test order made no significant difference while shorter, steadier cycles went with better quality and productivity, up to 14% better quality going from 50-minute to 8-minute cycles (small-to-medium effects, adjusted R2 about 0.1).
Used in
- Work in short, steady test-and-code cycles recommendation
- Try agent TDD on real, vague tickets trial
Alonso, arXiv 2026
TestingSpecification
On SWE-bench Verified with Qwen3-Coder 30B, a static test-impact map plus a short skill cut test-level regressions 70% (6.08% to 1.82%), while a procedural TDD prompt with no impact context raised them to 9.94%; single author, 100-125 instances, provisional.
Mock et al., XP 2024 workshop
TestingDeliverySecurity
Aggarwal et al., ICML 2025
TestingLoopingSecurity
Bastani et al., PNAS 2025
Understanding
Among about 1,000 students, unrestricted GPT lowered exam scores by 17%, while a hint-only tutor showed no exam penalty.
Used in
- Give hints, not answers, in learning tools recommendation
Kosmyna et al., arXiv 2025
Understanding
In a preprint (n=54), 83% of LLM users couldn't quote their own essay minutes later, and writers who started without AI showed higher brain connectivity once they used it than the AI-first group ever reached.
Used in
- Do unaided work first, then bring in AI recommendation
McCurdy et al., Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 2020
Understanding
Across 310 experiments, people recalled about 10 points more of what they generated themselves; general psychology, not AI-specific.
Fan et al., International Journal of STEM Education 2025
UnderstandingTeamwork
Among 234 students (self-report scales), human pairs scored significantly higher on collaboration and social presence than AI-assisted pairs or solo students.
Brynjolfsson et al., Stanford Digital Economy Lab 2026
UnderstandingTeamwork
In a descriptive working paper, early-career jobs (ages 22-25) in AI-exposed roles were 19% below trend.
Used in
Liu, Christian et al., COLM 2026
Understanding
Across three experiments with 1,058 online participants, after 11 to 12 problems with a GPT-5 sidebar people tested without it solved fewer problems (d from -0.20 to -0.45) and skipped more in two of three, with the cost sitting with people who asked for direct answers; fractions and reading comprehension, not coding, and no durability data.
Used in
- Ask the AI, don't delegate to it, while building a skill recommendation
Te'eni & Katz, HHAI 2026
UnderstandingSpecificationTeamwork
In one developer's four months with Claude Code (163 episodes), decisions had to be re-explained every session and agreed rules decayed as conversations grew; it builds theory and gives no prevalence.
Used in
Rezazadeh et al., arXiv 2025
UnderstandingSecurity
In a simulation of provenance-gated shared memory, accuracy went 0.27, then 0.61 after grants, then 0.37 after revocations; the paper has no proof of policy adherence, no attack test, and nothing on stale or conflicting entries.
Tiwari & Gupta, Discover Artificial Intelligence 2026
UnderstandingSecurity
A 2026 review says the provenance-gated memory approach ensures privacy, though the primary paper shows simulation only.
Horikawa et al., arXiv 2025
Delivery
Across 14,998 agentic commits (89.3% Codex-authored), low-level refactors were 35.8% vs a 24.4% human baseline and architectural refactors 43.0% vs 54.9%; design-smell counts showed no practically meaningful change (Cohen's d about -0.03).
Used in
- Don't leave structural refactoring to agents recommendation
Saba et al., Scientific Reports 2026
Delivery
A smaller, low-rigor comparison of refactoring tools on isolated snippets found wide model-to-model variance, with no human check on correctness.
Used in
- Don't leave structural refactoring to agents recommendation
Lyu et al., arXiv 2025
Teamwork
In a 39-student, one-semester study, solo-AI was the worst of three conditions and human-plus-AI scored highest, directly disagreeing with Fan et al.
Smith, ASEE 2026
Teamwork
A 10-study review found, corroborated across 2 studies, that after AI-paired programming students were more likely to believe they had a complete solution and no longer needed to learn to program.
Used in
Sun, Bai & Dredze, Findings of ACL 2026
MeasuringTesting
Peer-reviewed study showing that knowledge requirements shape LLM responses to context-memory conflict; not tested on code.
Used in
- Don't trust an AI grader you haven't checked recommendation
Shojaee et al. (Apple), arXiv 2025
Measuring
Apple preprint, The Illusion of Thinking, on early-2025 models.
Used in
Suoniemi, prompt-vs-metric-eval repository
TestingSpecification
Behavioural guidance gave about 83 percent genuine fixes on both models, against 29 and 6 percent for a bare linter message; one model did worse with the bare metric than with no guidance.
Used in
Tufano et al. (Google), SpecOps 2026
TestingSpecification
An agent that first wrote each unit's pre- and post-conditions caught 63.2% of 90 historical bugs within five runs against 53.4% for a plain test-writing agent (p=0.035, not significant at one or two runs), for 38% more tokens; most misses were conditions the spec left out.
Milanese et al., arXiv 2026
TestingMeasuringDeliveryLoopingSpecification
Within the same 391 Java repositories, agent PRs changed tests more often than human PRs (55.0% vs 45.8%), added tests more and modified or deleted existing tests less; pooled across repositories the gap vanished or reversed, and added test methods looked alike, mocks included.
Hora & Robbes, MSR 2026
TestingSpecification
Across 2,168 repositories with agent configuration files, 36% of agent test commits added a mock against 26% of other test commits (small effect); many CLAUDE.md files mention tests but few say how to mock.
Used in
Hasan et al., arXiv 2025
TestingMeasuring
Shi & Kristensson, ACM TOCHI 2026
TestingUnderstandingSpecification
Students brainstorming tests with a chatbot took the first 8-10 suggestions and stopped, with no gain over web search; a system that proposed one new test at a time from the editor's context, accepted or rejected each time, raised branch coverage of the combined human and AI tests by about a third.
Ardic et al., Empirical Software Engineering 2026
TestingUnderstanding
Students writing unit tests with ChatGPT split the work by who supplies the test idea and who writes the code; heavy delegators used one-shot prompts and had to fix wrong expected values by hand, and students reported lower quality, trust and ownership of generated tests.
Used in
Hamidi et al., arXiv 2026
TestingMeasuringSpecificationDelivery
LLM-written suites at full statement, branch or mutation adequacy triggered about a third of 6,066 hard bugs in LLM-written code but their assertions flagged only 1-2%; the three criteria barely differed, and assertions rewritten from the task description lifted detection by about 7 points.
Used in
- Keep a human upstream of what tests assert recommendation
- Don't read coverage as quality for AI-written tests recommendation
- No automated check tells you an assertion is right challenge
Haroon et al., arXiv 2026
TestingSpecificationDeliveryMeasuring
After one-line behaviour changes to small programs, about 99% of regenerated tests that failed still asserted what the unchanged program did, and pass rates also fell after behaviour-preserving edits.
Used in
- Keep a human upstream of what tests assert recommendation
- No automated check tells you an assertion is right challenge
Pancher et al., XP 2025
TestingLoopingDelivery
Students' own TDD code passed every reference test in 15 of 35 submissions against 12 when redone with ChatGPT; small iterative prompts and fixing by hand when the model stalled went with success, pasting the whole spec and refusing to touch the model's code with failure.
Used in
- Stop after about 3 failed fixes, then reset or escalate recommendation
- Work in short, steady test-and-code cycles recommendation
- Test-first results may not hold on current models challenge
Mock & Russo, Empirical Software Engineering 2026
TestingDelivery
Robbes et al., ACM TOSEM 2026
DeliveryMeasuringLoopingTesting
Coding-agent traces appeared in 22.20% (conservative) to 28.66% (high estimate) of 128,018 active GitHub repositories by February 2026; agent-assisted commits had a median of 31 added lines against 11 for human commits.
Used in
- Work in small batches with strong version control recommendation
Welter et al., ASE 2025
TeamworkUnderstanding
Human pairs had about twice as many knowledge-transfer exchanges as people working alone with an assistant, over more topics; alone with the assistant, 28% of knowledge was accepted on trust against 12% in pairs.
Liu et al. (AIShellJack), arXiv 2026
SecuritySpecificationReviewing
A poisoned coding rule file made Cursor and GitHub Copilot with auto-run execute attacker-intended commands in up to 84% of cases (41% to 83% by editor and model on one scenario); how the developer worded the task made little difference, while how the payload was framed decided success.
Zhu et al., EMNLP 2026
SecurityTestingSpecificationReviewing
In 1,920 runs in poisoned repositories, a planted secret reached an attacker server in 45.5% of runs when the agent was asked to run tests and 8.6% when asked to fix a bug; agents warned least on the test task; security rules raised warnings but not the share of attacks that failed; Claude Code with Sonnet 4.6 was the most resistant of four agent-model setups.
Used in
- Enforce access and approvals outside the model recommendation
- Don't treat a stronger model as a security control recommendation
- Read test and setup files before an agent runs them trial
- Review rules, skills and context files that come from outside the team trial
- Nobody knows how often agents leak secrets challenge
- Prompt injection has no proven fix challenge
Benchmarks
Mathews & Nagappan, ASE 2024
LoopingSpecificationTestingDeliveryMeasuring
Failed fixes piled up: no problem was solved on attempt 5 (GPT-4, Llama 3).
Used in
- Stop after about 3 failed fixes, then reset or escalate recommendation
- Keep a human upstream of what tests assert recommendation
- Give the model few, distinct tests recommendation
- Don't read coverage as quality for AI-written tests recommendation
- Re-test the supplied-tests benefit on current models trial
- Test loops fix the code, not a misread requirement challenge
- Nobody knows how much to specify up front challenge
Chen et al., ICLR 2024
LoopingTesting
The same debugging loop gained 2-3 points with no unit tests (text-to-SQL) and up to 12 points with them (C++ to Python, Codex 80.4% to 92.5%), a bare 'the code is wrong' message gained less than execution results wherever tests existed, and it matched baselines that drew 10 times more samples.
Used in
Madaan et al., NeurIPS 2023
LoopingTesting
Self-feedback improved 7 unlike tasks by about 20% absolute on average, but on math ChatGPT judged 94% of its own answers 'everything looks good' and an outside wrong-answer signal added over 5 points; partly GPT-4-judged, no equal-cost baseline.
Used in
- Loop only against a check the machine runs recommendation
- Don't loop on self-critique alone recommendation
Shinn et al., NeurIPS 2023
LoopingTestingSpecificationDelivery
With no tests, a reflection loop scored below no loop at all (0.52 vs 0.60), a small open model gained nothing (0.26 before and after), and no equal-cost baseline was reported.
Used in
- Loop only against a check the machine runs recommendation
- Don't loop on self-critique alone recommendation
- Keep a human upstream of what tests assert recommendation
- Re-test the supplied-tests benefit on current models trial
- Don't route retry loops to cheap models unchecked recommendation
Yang et al., NeurIPS 2024
LoopingSpecificationTestingSecurity
Failed runs cost twice as much as successful ones and more budget rarely rescued them, while collapsing old observations and adding a lint guardrail each lifted solve rate from 15% to 18% (GPT-4 Turbo).
Used in
- Stop after about 3 failed fixes, then reset or escalate recommendation
- Keep each agent's context small recommendation
- Trim tools and what they return recommendation
- Don't give agents tools shaped for people recommendation
Li et al. (Microsoft), arXiv 2026
LoopingTestingMeasuring
The best result on 112 long tasks was 25.0% resolved (Opus 4.7 in Claude Code with an outer continuation loop, 17.0% without), regressions occurred in all four loop profiles, and the same model (gpt-5.4) scored from 18.75% in Codex down to 7.14% in mini-swe-agent, with the Ralph loop at 7.84% against 24.11% for dynamic workflows; Microsoft authors, tasks built with Claude Code.
Pan et al., ICML 2025
Looping
A verifier trained on agent runs raised SWE-bench Verified from 20.6% (one attempt) to 32.0% (best of 16), but the right patch was often produced and not picked (fine-tuned Qwen2.5-Coder-32B, late-2024 open model).
Used in
Antoniades et al., ICLR 2025
LoopingTesting
Orlanski et al., arXiv 2026
LoopingTestingDeliveryReviewingMeasuring
Code quality decays as agents extend their own work, and quality-aware prompts change the starting point but not the rate.
Used in
- Don't treat a passing suite or a green loop as done recommendation
- Don't choose tools by public leaderboard rankings recommendation
- Don't leave structural refactoring to agents recommendation
- Code erodes as agents build on their own work challenge
Aleithan et al., arXiv 2024
MeasuringTesting
31.1% of passed SWE-bench patches were suspicious because the tests were weak (reported secondhand via TDD-Bench Verified).
Used in
- Grade agents on tests they never saw recommendation
Ahmed et al. (IBM), arXiv 2024
MeasuringTestingSpecificationDelivery
Cited for weak graders: it relays the SWE-Bench+ figure, and the same row reports that 44 of 500 (8.8%) SWE-bench Verified golden tests weren't fail-to-pass or covered no changed lines.
Used in
- Grade agents on tests they never saw recommendation
- Keep a human upstream of what tests assert recommendation
- Don't read coverage as quality for AI-written tests recommendation
- Re-test the supplied-tests benefit on current models trial
- Test-first results may not hold on current models challenge
Ye et al., ICLR 2026
MeasuringTestingSpecificationDelivery
Almost all code failures in this Lean 4 benchmark were compile errors (o3: 25.8 of 27.4 points), so its code score mostly measures writing Lean that compiles.
Used in
- Keep a human upstream of what tests assert recommendation
Gloaguen et al., arXiv 2026
SpecificationUnderstandingDeliveryTeamwork
LLM-generated context files lowered success slightly and raised cost 20-23%, hand-written ones gave +2.4% over no file (p=0.21) with cost up to 19%, repo overviews did not help agents find files, and tools named in a context file were used 1.6 times per task against under 0.01 otherwise, with reasoning tokens up 10-22% (GPT-5.x and Sonnet 4.5).
Used in
- Write context files by hand and keep them short recommendation
- Don't let an LLM generate your context files recommendation
- Restart the session when output degrades trial
- Write a handoff note at each session boundary trial
- Enforce standards with checks, not documents recommendation
- Every line in the context file costs money challenge
Chao et al., arXiv 2026
SpecificationUnderstanding
The best model scored 55.2% on acting on updated facts.
Used in
- Agents act on outdated facts challenge
Debenedetti et al., arXiv 2025
SecuritySpecificationReviewing
Isolating untrusted data from planning and checking each tool call against a policy blocked nearly all AgentDojo attacks, solving 77% of tasks vs 84% undefended at about 2.8x the tokens; spotlighting alone cut Claude 3.5 Sonnet's successful attacks from 44 to 5 of 949, with no guarantee and no adaptive attack tested (preprint, Google authors who also built the benchmark).
Used in
Wang et al., arXiv 2025
Security
Poisoned tool descriptions succeeded on 36.5% of test cases on average and up to 72.8% across 20 model settings, with refusals under 3%; reasoning mode raised attack success (Qwen3 32B: 58.5% vs 23.7%). Measures susceptibility, not real-world incidence, and tested no defences.
Used in
- Allowlist MCP servers and enforce access at the tool layer recommendation
- Don't treat a stronger model as a security control recommendation
- Don't install third-party MCP servers unreviewed recommendation
Chen et al., arXiv 2026
TestingDeliveryLoopingReviewingMeasuring
Most models avoided regressions under 25% of the time.
Used in
- Work in small batches with strong version control recommendation
- Don't treat a passing suite or a green loop as done recommendation
- Don't choose tools by public leaderboard rankings recommendation
- Code erodes as agents build on their own work challenge
Chen et al. (SecureVibeBench), arXiv 2026
SecurityMeasuringTesting
On 105 real C/C++ tasks the best of 13 agent-model combinations produced 23.8% patches that were both correct and secure; in most combinations over half of correct patches still carried a security issue; two CLI agents ranked top on correctness but not on secure correctness.
Used in
- Treat agent output as untrusted input recommendation
- Don't treat a stronger model as a security control recommendation
- Replay past vulnerabilities as tests on agent patches trial
UK AISI Inspect Evals, ipi_coding_agent, 2026
SecurityReviewing
On 35 injected bug-fixing tasks, injection resistance ranged from 68.6% to 97.1% across five models, newer models resisted more, and explicit detection of an injection happened about once in 140 injected samples.
Used in
- Prompt injection has no proven fix challenge
Telemetry
Medisetty (Uber), Building an efficient software factory, 2026
LoopingMeasuringSpecificationSecurity
Cost per session fell 52% with compaction, default effort levels, caching and spend nudges.
Used in
Ars Technica, Meta's scrapped plans to go AI-native, 2026
MeasuringDelivery
Per an internal CTO post reported secondhand, code changes at Meta rose 220% while user-facing feature changes rose 36%.
Used in
- Measure time to an accepted change, not lines or PRs recommendation
Orosz, Interesting AI coding stats from Cursor, 2026
MeasuringReviewingSecurity
One model cost about 2x another per agent request but tied per accepted line; Orosz notes Cursor gains if its own model looks cheap.
Used in
- Normalise cost by accepted output trial
- Grant agents the fewest tools and the minimum scopes recommendation
- Don't let agents commit without review recommendation
AWS, PHP2Shell exploitation before public disclosure, 2026
Security
Honeypot telemetry saw a PHP2Shell exploit attempt 4 days before disclosure, proof-of-concept exploits about 12 hours before the embargo lifted, and several actors within hours of the patch (AWS sells detection and WAF products).
Used in
Surveys
METR, AI usage survey, 2026
LoopingMeasuring
Median value uplift was 1.4-2x against 3x speed, and every checkable 10x claim was overstated.
Used in
- Time real tasks instead of trusting forecasts or surveys recommendation
DORA, State of AI-assisted software development, 2025
LoopingMeasuringUnderstandingDeliveryTestingTeamwork
Delivery instability rises with AI adoption, while small batches amplified product performance and reduced friction (survey of about 5,000).
Used in
- Work in small batches with strong version control recommendation
- Measure time to an accepted change, not lines or PRs recommendation
- Time real tasks instead of trusting forecasts or surveys recommendation
- Pair juniors with seniors on agent-assisted work trial
- Keep user focus recommendation
- Strong engineering foundations may not protect you challenge
Skibba (The Guardian), Workers say they're drowning in workslop, 2026
Measuring
Reports secondhand a WSJ survey of 5,000 in which 92% of executives say AI makes them more productive and 40% of non-managers say it saves no time; its account of the Liebscher study gives 1,150 workers and 40% exposure, a discrepancy the doc calls unexplained.
Used in
- Time real tasks instead of trusting forecasts or surveys recommendation
Liebscher et al., preprint 2026
MeasuringReviewingTeamwork
ICONIQ, State of AI, 2026
Measuring
Executives report about 31% time savings from coding assistance (executive self-report, n=247).
Used in
Vendor reports
Huang et al. (Anthropic), How AI is transforming work at Anthropic, 2025
LoopingUnderstandingDeliveryTeamwork
Engineers fully delegate 0-20% of their work.
Databricks, Managing AI coding costs at scale, 2026
LoopingMeasuringSecurity
Jain, Are harnesses worth the cost?, 2026
LoopingTesting
On one Java service scored by 178 hidden acceptance tests, a test-feedback harness took a cost-optimised model from 3 of 10 to 10 of 10 accepted at 3.9 times the tokens, while a flagship model was 10 of 10 either way at 10.5 times the tokens with the harness; the author founded the company whose tool built the harness.
Used in
Young (Anthropic), Effective harnesses for long-running agents, 2026
Looping
Proposes a JSON feature list where only the passes field is editable to stop premature completion claims.
Used in
Orosz, Uber's AI infra from the inside (podcast), 2026
LoopingMeasuringSpecificationReviewingTestingSecurity
Osmani et al. (Anthropic), How the Claude Code team does code review, 2026
LoopingReviewingUnderstandingTestingSecurityMeasuring
Anthropic, The advisor strategy
Looping
A cheap model consulting a strong advisor gained 2.7 points on SWE-bench Multilingual at 11.9% less cost per task.
Used in
Yoon (PostHog), Jobs every engineer should automate with agents, 2026
Looping
A flaky-test agent checking every 3 hours filed 72 reports since July, 11 of which (about 15%) led to merged fixes, while agent-sent tool-feedback reports ran to a few thousand, too many to read; vendor self-report.
Used in
Raghavan (Harness), The impact of GitHub Copilot on developer productivity, 2023
MeasuringDelivery
A before/after study (n=50) by a vendor of engineering metrics found 10.6% more PRs with Copilot, with no quality data.
Used in
- Measure time to an accepted change, not lines or PRs recommendation
GitHub, Does GitHub Copilot improve code quality?, 2024
Measuring
Unsigned vendor post with no paper: 13.6% more lines per readability error with Copilot, reviewed only by the 25 developers whose code passed every test.
Used in
- Don't decide on vendor-reported figures recommendation
Orosz, What's the ROI of engineers' AI spending?, 2026
MeasuringReviewing
Vendor data shows weekly PRs up 113% and monthly PRs up 127% year on year among CodeRabbit users; interviews across 27 companies found spend from under $300 to $3,000+ per developer per month and PR change from flat to 5-10x, with one company's PR size tripling while count stayed flat.
Raicea (PostHog), A beginner's guide to testing AI agents, 2026
MeasuringTesting
Chatterji et al. (OpenAI), How organizations use AI, 2026
MeasuringLooping
OpenAI's own working paper on ChatGPT Enterprise says message volume measures intensity, not economic importance.
Used in
- Don't rank people by AI usage recommendation
Anthropic, The AI-native SDLC playbook, 2026
SpecificationReviewingSecurity
Advises planning before code and committing the plan, and says a skill makes violations rare while a hook makes them close to impossible; untested.
Used in
- Commit a plan before code trial
- Enforce the most-violated rules with hooks trial
- Write a review policy trial
- Grant agents the fewest tools and the minimum scopes recommendation
- Deny secrets to agents and force the sandbox recommendation
- Tier agent autonomy by alert severity trial
- Nobody knows how often agents leak secrets challenge
LangChain, The anatomy of an agent harness, 2026
Specification
Load skill bodies only when they are used.
Used in
Kim & Gencay (System Design Newsletter), How to cut your Claude Code token usage, 2026
Specification
Advises starting a new conversation when compaction fires every few messages or earlier rules are forgotten, carrying over a short hand-off summary and keeping standing rules in CLAUDE.md; sponsored, no data.
Used in
Lopopolo (OpenAI), Harness engineering, 2026
Specification
One big instruction file failed, so the team kept a short AGENTS.md as a table of contents over structured docs and enforced rules with custom linters; unmeasured, output figures are self-estimates.
Faros, AI engineering report, 2026
ReviewingMeasuringSecurityDeliveryLoopingTesting
Osmani, Agentic code review, 2026
ReviewingSecurityMeasuring
CircleCI, What 28 million workflows reveal, 2026
ReviewingMeasuringDeliveryLoopingTesting
Lucas et al. (Anthropic), Formal software verification with LLMs, 2026
ReviewingTestingSecurity
Trebacz et al. (OpenAI), Verifying code at scale, 2025
Reviewing
OpenAI says its Codex reviewer caught more critical issues with fewer false alarms once given repository access and execution, that 52.7% of its comments led to a code change across over 100k PRs a day, and that recall fell faster on model-written code (figures not reproduced).
Used in
Durnas (Aikido), What is slopsquatting?, 2026
Security
A squatted fake package name got 30,000+ downloads in three months (Lasso), and one spread to 237 repos through LLM-generated agent skills.
Used in
- Verify a package's publisher and registration date recommendation
Aikido, SafeChain
Security
A wrapper around npm, npx, yarn and pnpm that checks installs against a malware feed.
Used in
OpenAI, Coordinated disclosure of critical vulnerabilities, 2026
Security
Says its model found the flaws before attackers, 'to our knowledge'; the AWS telemetry undercuts that head start.
Used in
Yan & Dattani (Anthropic), Using LLMs to secure source code, 2026
SecurityTesting
GitHub, Security validation for third-party coding agents, 2026
SecurityReviewing
Tablan et al., arXiv 2025
Understanding
In a vendor preprint, a shared memory raised LLM-judged code quality most for small models, 4.23 to 4.89 on a 5-point scale; the memory was seeded from the benchmark's own reference answers and no execution tests were reported.
Letta, Benchmarking AI agent memory, 2026
Understanding
Letta says an agent using a plain filesystem scored 74.0% on the LoCoMo chat-recall benchmark with GPT-4o mini, against 68.5% reported for Mem0's graph variant.
Used in
Chhikara et al. (Mem0), arXiv 2025
Understanding
Mem0's own preprint scores full context at 72.90 and Mem0 at 66.88 on a judge metric; the benchmark tests conversation recall, not coding.
Used in
Suprmind, AI hallucination rates, 2026
Measuring
Vendor aggregator of AI hallucination rates, secondhand.
Used in
- Don't decide on vendor-reported figures recommendation
Liao, Agents don't need memory, 2026
UnderstandingSpecification
Argues agent memory should be a maintained Markdown brain that the agent reads before and updates after each task, not snippets retrieved from a vector store; he still trims it by hand.
Used in
Anthropic, The components of agent memory, 2026
SpecificationUnderstandingLooping
A second pass that checked memory notes against session logs corrected a wrong note and changed one run's outcome; a linked knowledge base beat search alone only when search was kept beside it (61% against 53% of graded criteria, on its own 48%), and one grew larger than its source documents; several agents writing one shared page lost 16 of 57 facts until each had its own page; telling models to record only failures cut their memory gains.
Token Security (The Hacker News), We built an agent that broke all of our security rules, 2026
Security
A browser agent inside a user's signed-in session has the user's full access, and the app cannot tell its actions from the user's; the vendor says agent lanes must carry the agent's identity, a verifiable link to the person, and a scope narrower than the person's, and that current drafts each carry only one.
Google, Gemini in Chrome auto browse help
Security
Chrome's auto browse agent uses the user's signed-in sites, is limited to sites relevant to the task, asks before sensitive sites and consequential actions, and marks pages it visited in history; nothing tells the visited site an agent is driving.
Used in
Microsoft, New in Edge for Business: AI for work, safe from day one, 2026
Security
Edge for Business agentic browsing is off unless enabled by policy, runs only on sites IT designates, pauses before passwords and card numbers, and keeps signed-in sites signed in through the user's cookies.
Used in
Practitioner reports
Farr, The Ralph playbook, 2026
LoopingSecurity
Permission-bypass flags leave the sandbox as the only boundary.
Used in
- Sandbox anything unattended recommendation
- Deny secrets to agents and force the sandbox recommendation
- Nobody knows how often agents leak secrets challenge
Cooper, Coding agents and driving in gears, 2026
LoopingReviewing
Osmani, Software factories, 2026
Looping
Heuristics that agents hold up for 3-10 steps and drift past 20, and that a loop earns unattended running with a cheap, frequent, hard-to-fake check.
Huntley, Ralph Wiggum as a software engineer, 2025
LoopingTesting
Luu, Programming language and token efficiency, 2026
LoopingMeasuringTesting
Augmented Coding Patterns, Patterns catalog
LoopingSpecificationReviewingSecurityUnderstandingDelivery
Catalog patterns Overnight Batch and Smart Plan, Cheap Execution propose running low-risk work overnight and having the strongest model plan while a cheaper one executes; no data.
Used in
- Run low-risk tickets unattended overnight trial
- Let a cheaper model execute a strong model's plan trial
- Commit a plan before code trial
- Add a focused commit or review subagent trial
- Groom memory files monthly trial
- Add a candour ground rule trial
- Have agents write scripts for deterministic work trial
- Slice big agent branches for review trial
- Tier agent autonomy by alert severity trial
- Keep an ADR per agent-built feature trial
- Have the agent restate the plan and object before coding trial
- Prototype requests cheaply for a user cohort trial
Dex (HumanLayer), Why software factories fail, 2026
LoopingReviewingSpecificationDelivery
A no-review factory was abandoned after about three unrecoverable failures (one company).
Böckeler, Maintainability sensors for coding agents, 2026
LoopingTestingSpecificationMeasuring
Proposes sensors at four cadences: in-session, CI, scheduled and production.
Fornasier, Getting out of the loop, 2026
LoopingMeasuringUnderstandingReviewing
The bottleneck moves to task definition (n=1).
Used in
Karpathy, Dwarkesh Podcast 2025
LoopingSpecificationMeasuringTesting
Agents were not net useful for novel, precisely arranged code, pushing standard patterns, defensive bloat and deprecated APIs, but helped with boilerplate and a tested port to an unfamiliar language (n=1).
Böckeler, Experiences with local models for coding, 2026
Looping
A locally run 35B mixture-of-experts model handled scripts and small well-specified changes but fell apart on complex logic, and one task failed 5 of 7 automated reruns on one machine (two tasks, one evaluator).
Green (Forbes), AI costs more than the people it replaced, 2026
MeasuringLooping
Ludic, AI mania is eviscerating global decision-making, 2026
MeasuringLooping
Bharade (Business Insider), Uber's COO on justifying AI token spend, 2026
Measuring
Reports that Duolingo dropped AI usage from performance reviews.
Majors (Honeycomb), AI norms and values part 3, 2026
MeasuringReviewingTeamwork
Pinecoder, My old job feels very distant now, 2026
MeasuringReviewingUnderstandingSecurity
One engineer reports about 3x merged PRs after a model upgrade, with method and baseline not shown (personal essay, n=1).
Augmented Coding Patterns, Selective hearing obstacle
Specification
Rules that fight the model's training silently revert.
Used in
Böckeler, Understanding spec-driven development, 2025
Specification
A spec tool turned a small bug into 4 user stories and 16 acceptance criteria, and reviewing many verbose spec files was worse than reviewing code (one evaluator, 2025).
Used in
Orosz, What is happening with code reviews?, 2026
ReviewingSecuritySpecificationTeamwork
GitHub PR volume rose about 5x in three years, and a 5-person team routing risky changes to humans and the rest to AI review went from 80 to 154 PRs per week (self-reported).
Used in
Orosz, Concern about code review load, 2026
Reviewing
Uber filters AI review comments by confidence and merges duplicates.
Used in
Mikhin & Turner (Evil Martians), 10 anti-AI-slop moves, 2026
ReviewingTestingMeasuring
Tornhill, Controlling the uncertainty machine, 2026
ReviewingSpecification
Bug fixes get light inspection and novel features deeper structural review, never full line-by-line reading; each review finding becomes an agent skill (his company sells code-health tooling).
OWASP, LLM01 Prompt injection, 2025
SecuritySpecification
OWASP says it is unclear if there are fool-proof methods of prevention; RAG and fine-tuning don't fully mitigate it, and detecting injected text is an open problem.
Used in
- Enforce access and approvals outside the model recommendation
- Don't rely on delimiting untrusted content as the defence recommendation
OWASP community, MCP tool poisoning
Security
A malicious MCP server's tool responses carry instructions the agent follows; tools are reviewed at connect time but responses are trusted at runtime (no incidence data).
Used in
OWASP, LLM02 Sensitive information disclosure, 2025
Security
The OWASP category the tab maps the lethal trifecta and credential exposure to.
Used in
- Remove one leg of the lethal trifecta recommendation
- Deny secrets to agents and force the sandbox recommendation
OWASP, LLM06 Excessive agency, 2025
Security
Root causes are excessive functionality, permissions and autonomy; logging and rate limits limit damage but don't prevent it.
Used in
- Grant agents the fewest tools and the minimum scopes recommendation
OWASP, LLM07 System prompt leakage, 2025
Security
System prompts should be treated as extractable.
Used in
- Deny secrets to agents and force the sandbox recommendation
OWASP, LLM08 Vector and embedding weaknesses, 2025
Security
Embeddings can be inverted to recover text, shared stores leak across permission boundaries, and indexed documents can carry hidden instructions.
Used in
OWASP, LLM04 Data and model poisoning, 2025
Security
Tampered models, LoRA adapters and poisoned data; backdoors can lie dormant.
Used in
- Inventory, sign and pin models and packages recommendation
OWASP, LLM09 Misinformation, 2025
SecurityReviewingUnderstanding
The OWASP category, including overreliance, that the tab maps slopsquatting, insecure code and skill loss to.
Used in
- Verify a package's publisher and registration date recommendation
- Give security-sensitive changes a human review recommendation
- Keep people hands-on recommendation
OWASP, LLM03 Supply chain, 2025
Security
Covers tampered models and packages; vendors can change terms to train on customer data.
Used in
- Verify a package's publisher and registration date recommendation
- Inventory, sign and pin models and packages recommendation
- Sign a data processing agreement before tools see company data recommendation
OWASP, A03 Software supply chain failures, 2025
Security
The web Top 10 category the tab cites for agent-picked dependencies.
Used in
- Inventory, sign and pin models and packages recommendation
OWASP, Software supply chain security cheat sheet
Security
Recommends SBOMs, signed sources, pinned registries and egress controls on fetches.
Used in
- Inventory, sign and pin models and packages recommendation
OWASP, LLM05 Improper output handling, 2025
Security
Model output is passed to shells, SQL or browsers without validation; a coding agent's shell tool does this by design.
Used in
- Treat agent output as untrusted input recommendation
OWASP, LLM10 Unbounded consumption, 2025
SecurityMeasuring
Pay-per-use pricing can be exploited; OWASP favours rate limits, quotas, timeouts and iteration caps.
Used in
- Set rate limits, quotas, timeouts and iteration caps recommendation
Böckeler, TDD inside the agent loop, 2026
TestingLoopingDeliverySpecification
An agent (Sonnet 4.6) running TDD alone on a clear spec reached the same correctness and mutation score at 3x to 8.5x the tokens, and in every TDD run skipped RED, over-implemented or wrote tautological tests (5 batches, LLM judge, small experiment).
bdfinst, TDD vs. non-TDD in agentic development, 2026
TestingDeliveryLooping
Tornhill, Practices I abandoned with agents, 2026
TestingReviewingSecurity
Vaccari, Acceptance tests for AI-assisted development, 2025
TestingDeliveryReviewing
Beck, Pragmatic Engineer podcast 2025
TestingDeliverySecurity
Beck, Augmented coding: beyond the vibes, 2025
TestingDelivery
Ördög (Augmented Coding Patterns), Approved scenarios
TestingReviewing
Spati, Obsidian vault to enterprise company brain, 2026
UnderstandingSecurity
A blog with a demo, unmeasured, describes a design that blocks a conflicting memory write until a human decides.
Litt, Understanding is the new bottleneck, 2026
UnderstandingReviewing
Proposes a 5-question quiz on a change before shipping it.
Used in
Würsch, AI doesn't replace engineering discipline, 2026
UnderstandingReviewing
Proposes a comprehension commit gate for juniors.
Used in
antirez, Writing system software: code comments, 2018
Understanding
Cited for writing the message yourself as the ownership check.
Used in
goblindegook, The wastes of product engineering, 2023
UnderstandingTeamworkDelivery
Argues pairing keeps intent in at least two heads.
James, How to go fast, 2019
UnderstandingTeamwork
Argues pairing keeps intent in at least two heads.
Spati, Nobody knows anything anymore, 2026
UnderstandingTeamwork
A growing note built on one anonymous account argues the bigger risk is whole teams no longer knowing the architecture or why choices were made.
Used in
Stannard, Software hyper-delivery, 2026
UnderstandingReviewing
On one bug fix (n=1), reading the diff, running the tests and questioning the agent was judging, not understanding; only re-implementing the fix gave understanding.
Used in
Karpathy, Making LLM outputs easier to understand (X post), 2026
Understanding
Claims, without evidence, that a ladder of output formats from controlled English to diagrams, HTML pages and explainer videos makes oversight easier; the author is a former AI-education founder, an interest the post does not disclose.
Edwards-Alexander, The economic benefit of refactoring, 2026
Delivery
Splitting a large file cut tokens per change 83%; the agent couldn't choose refactorings unaided (n=1).
Nakashima (Honeycomb), AI norms and values part 2, 2026
ReviewingTeamwork
Sets a target of 25% of PRs reviewed by AI and auto-merged without human review by the end of 2026, at a change failure rate under 3%, and admits a related goal is already off track.
Used in
- Review load lands on senior engineers challenge
Abitbol (Revolut), AI Engineer NYC 2026
LoopingMeasuring
Bache, Agentic AI coding breaks mob programming, 2026
SpecificationUnderstandingTeamwork
Agents break mob programming's timed rotation, intention-only talking and quiet-or-chaotic screen watching; she uses silent shared prompt writing, running commentary, reading the summary aloud and a retro that names the patterns used.
Böckeler, tdd-comparisons repository
TestingSpecificationLoopingDelivery
The test-first prompt had no test-list step and told the agent not to design up front; one improved prompt produced both the best and the fourth-best of four runs.
Bache with Ördög, How to stop AI from ruining your codebase, 2026
TestingSpecification
Agents split a function only to satisfy a length limit; a hook that turns the linter's output into a short prompt saying what the smell means and how to fix it gave better refactors in the demo.
Bache with Selander, The most important AI coding advice you haven't heard, 2026
TestingSpecificationSecurity
Telling an agent to follow TDD failed because it skipped steps and over-implemented, so he blocks violations with hooks outside the prompt; he still reads every change.
Used in
Newton-King (Microsoft), Inside the LLM call, 2026
MeasuringLoopingTesting
Liu (IBM) & Solomon (Google), AI agent observability, 2025
MeasuringTestingLooping
Laycock (Thoughtworks), Why are good developers so wary of agentic development?, 2026
DeliveryUnderstandingTestingLoopingReviewing
In a week where agents wrote all the code, participants estimated about two thirds of their time went on the whiteboard and one third on the harness, yet the build was often red; the author argues that built is not the same as working in production.
Edwards-Alexander (Thoughtworks), An accidental blackboard, 2026
LoopingTeamworkSpecificationUnderstanding
With agents sharing a numbered spec and keeping plans in the repo, they began using the plans to claim work and hand off notes; frequent pushes overloaded CI so the team backed off, and the author wants the channel kept outside source control.
Luu, We should be more ambitious with the software we build, 2026
DeliveryUnderstandingMeasuring
Reports building a tunable regex engine, a faster ripgrep fork and a Rust build speed-up in low single-digit hours each, and argues people skip such projects out of a pre-agent cost model; includes Kreinin's rebuttal that most people lack pass/fail checks and should aim smaller.
Kunal, Resisting cognitive surrender, 2026
UnderstandingReviewingSecurityDelivery
Reports that relying on agents made his systems more complex and his understanding of them thinner, and sets a per-project limit on what to hand over, with held-out validation, observability, shadow traffic and fast reverts for work he does delegate.
Essays and opinion
Willison, The lethal trifecta for AI agents, 2025
LoopingSecurityReviewing
About 15 vendor products whose agents combined private data, untrusted input and an outbound channel were exploited in 2023-2025.
Used in
- Sandbox anything unattended recommendation
- Remove one leg of the lethal trifecta recommendation
- Allowlist MCP servers and enforce access at the tool layer recommendation
- Red-team our agents with seeded injections trial
- Prompt injection has no proven fix challenge
Angelo (Fortune), Uber burned through its 2026 AI budget, 2026
LoopingSecurityMeasuring
Uber used its whole 2026 AI-coding budget in four months after a usage leaderboard.
Used in
- Don't rank people by AI usage recommendation
- Set rate limits, quotas, timeouts and iteration caps recommendation
Zechner, Thoughts on slowing down, 2026
LoopingDeliverySpecification
Removing the human bottleneck removes the pain signal.
Emanuel, The overprompting trap, 2026
LoopingSpecification
Uses a plan-then-execute split but insists on an overpowered executor; opinion.
Morris, Humans and agents in software engineering loops, 2026
Looping
Humans work 'on the loop', changing the specs, checks and guidance that steer the agent rather than the artefact when results are wrong; conceptual, no data.
Used in
Anderson, Models and agents are outpacing their interfaces, 2026
Measuring
Newsletter forecast with no data: steering people to cheaper models can raise retries and human correction and erase the saving.
Used in
Ewerlöf, Coding is not solved, 2026
MeasuringReviewingUnderstandingSecurity
Essay by a critic of AI mandates, anecdotes only: token usage as a productivity proxy is a vanity metric.
Bean, Strauss & Singh (HBR), Performance management needs new metrics, 2026
Measuring
Prescriptive: keep separate scorecards for human, agent and combined system.
Used in
Odell, The great agent skills land grab, 2026
Specification
Skills should carry novel information or code.
Used in
Piskala, arXiv 2026
Specification
Keep the spec in sync with code through tests for long-lived systems, use the least rigour that removes ambiguity, and skip specs for exploratory work; no data, and its 'up to 50%' error cut is secondhand and unverified.
Used in
Ewerlöf, AI systems engineering patterns, 2025
Specification
Proposes loading the whole working set into context instead of retrieving chunks (CAG) for full recall; no data, partly drafted with Gemini.
Used in
Kohler (NN/g), The new big ball of mud, 2026
Specification
Without sorting context by role, nontechnical builders' agent systems grow as big balls of mud.
Used in
Foote & Yoder, Big ball of mud, 1997
Specification
Origin of the term 'big ball of mud', which the authors call a pattern, not an antipattern.
Used in
Perez (NN/g), Context architecture, 2026
Specification
Position paper arguing for information architecture for context; argued, not measured.
Used in
Fowler, The spec can come later, 2026
Specification
Argues for hacking until something works, recovering a spec from the session and regenerating to see what the spec kept; a first spec is always wrong and regenerating a bug keeps the bug.
Used in
Gonzalez, A sufficiently detailed spec is code, 2026
Specification
A spec detailed enough to generate software is thinly veiled code, so specs are not cheaper than code; its evidence is one author, one spec, one Claude Code run.
Used in
Marin-Perez, The mythical well-defined project, 2026
Specification
Most projects are well defined but poorly specified, so agents can run free only where any decent output will do; no data, author sells consultancy and training.
Used in
Brasil, When I reject AI code even if it works, 2026
ReviewingUnderstanding
Rejects green code the author cannot explain.
Used in
Tanna, Why I still hand-write my commit messages, 2026
ReviewingUnderstanding
Advocates hand-writing commit messages.
Used in
Lawson, You can just choose how many bugs you want now, 2026
Reviewing
Without a simplification pass, each bug gets its own patch.
Used in
Luu, Notes on agentic coding, 2026
ReviewingTesting
Cervera, Vibe everything, 2026
ReviewingSecurityTeamwork
Ellens, The system is on the other side of the glass, 2026
ReviewingUnderstandingTesting
Generated tests and AI reviewers each add an interpretation between the engineer and the running system, and AI quality gates turn those interpretations into decisions (no data).
Mollick, An opinionated guide to which AI to use, 2026
Security
Approve anything that sends, spends or deletes.
Used in
- Remove one leg of the lethal trifecta recommendation
New York Times, Anthropic copyright settlement, 2025
Security
Anthropic agreed a $1.5B copyright settlement.
Used in
Times of Israel, AI-flagged cargo (relaying CNN), 2026
Security
Relays a CNN exclusive that an intelligence report partly produced with AI nearly led to an armed boarding of a ship; unnamed sources, no official confirmation.
Used in
Trending Topics, False AI intelligence report (relaying CNN), 2026
Security
Relays the same CNN exclusive about an AI-assisted intelligence report and a near-miss ship boarding; unnamed sources, no official confirmation.
Used in
Orosz, Time to rethink software security, 2026
Security
Infers that AI drives faster exploitation and the October 2026 incident cluster (opinion with incident relays).
Used in
AI Made Tools, Test-driven development with AI, 2026
Testing
Proposes a human writes plain-language test intent, AI expands it into test code, a human implements the production code and AI only refactors after (unbylined, low confidence).
Used in
Bainbridge, Automatica 1983
Understanding
Automation research prescribes regular manual control to keep operator skills; it comes from industrial automation, not LLMs.
Used in
Yu et al., arXiv 2026
UnderstandingSecurity
A position paper names the gap of when one agent's memory write must become visible to another, but measures nothing.
Used in
Storey, Cognitive debt, 2026
UnderstandingReviewingLooping
Argues at least one human should fully understand each AI change, and that teams should record why, not what.
Storey, What I'm hearing about cognitive debt, 2026
Understanding
Argues docs are not sufficient if they are not living artifacts.
Used in
Ronacher, The tower keeps rising, 2026
UnderstandingTeamwork
Argues agents remove the friction that synchronised people.
Used in
Sahai, We're gonna need a lot more mathematicians, 2026
UnderstandingTeamwork
Essay with a hypothetical example, arguing for more funding of the author's own field: at society scale, understanding must sit outside whoever proposes the system.
Used in
Atwood, Rubber duck problem solving, 2012
UnderstandingReviewing
A 2012 essay with anecdotes argues explaining to a listener that cannot answer finds the gap.
Used in
Kaya, The Feynman technique, 2026
UnderstandingReviewing
Popular guide with no cited studies to writing a plain-words explanation for a novice.
Used in
Parrish (Farnam Street), The Feynman technique, 2012
UnderstandingReviewing
Popular guide with no cited studies to writing a plain-words explanation for a novice; its steps differ from other guides.
Used in
Feynman, Knowing versus understanding (lecture excerpt), 2012
UnderstandingReviewing
Physics, not code: two equivalent descriptions suggest different next changes, so being able to propose a change is a sharper test of understanding.
Used in
James, The weight of AI on engineers, 2026
DeliveryTeamwork
Kenny & Pogrebna (HBR), AI is changing how customers choose your business, 2026
Delivery
Describes cohort releases within a week.
Used in
Laforgia, The Agile Manifesto has lost relevance, 2026
DeliveryMeasuring
Faler, AI and the illusion of velocity, 2026
DeliveryMeasuring
Tornhill, Compressed cognition, 2026
Delivery
Agents compress a day of decisions into one session.
Used in
Yegge, The AI vampire, 2026
Delivery
Argues for 3-4 hour workdays with agents.
Used in
Boag (Smashing Magazine), Is your organization messing up AI adoption?, 2026
DeliveryTeamwork
Orosz with Majors, Stop being skeptical about AI for development, 2026
ReviewingTeamwork
Majors argues code review is the least valuable part of what humans add, that trust should move from authorship to tests and evals, and that engineers will ship code they never read.
Used in
- Review load lands on senior engineers challenge
James, We learned this lesson already, 2026
SpecificationTestingDelivery
Argues that exhaustive upfront specification is waterfall in disguise and that spec-driven development repeats it: what to build is discovered by building.
Used in
Goedecke, In defense of not understanding your codebase, 2026
Understanding
Argues that partial, even wrong, understanding is the normal working state on large, high-turnover codebases, and that LLMs are one of many ordinary things that get in the way of it.
Used in
Farley, The industry is catching up, 2026
TestingSpecificationDeliveryReviewing
Argues that when a machine writes the code, the human's job is an executable acceptance-test specification in four layers, written one scenario at a time, kept out of the agent's reach and approved by a person.
Grove, The new code, 2025
SpecificationTestingDelivery
Argues that code is a lossy projection of the specification, so teams should write and keep the spec, make it executable and test against it.
Used in
Bache, The last year has changed everything I knew about TDD, 2026
TestingDeliveryLoopingSpecification
Argues that the study finding no gain from TDD in the agent loop used a thin prompt (no test list, weak refactoring, no smell sensors), so the question is still open.
Bache, It doesn't help to push AI into a crappy process, 2026
DeliveryTestingMeasuringSpecification
Says AI hung on a code-first process closes tickets faster but leaves the same weak tests and design, and describes the test-list, small-slice loop that experienced TDD practitioners use with agents.
Used in
van den Berg, The Mythical Man-Month in the age of AI, 2026
LoopingTeamworkUnderstanding
Argues Brooks's Law still holds with agents: sequential work stays sequential, the overhead moves to defining done and stitching work together, and more agents on unclear requirements give the wrong answer faster.
Used in
Griffith, Do we need code review anymore in 2026?, 2026
ReviewingTeamworkUnderstanding
Argues review's lasting value is the shared question of why a change exists, with knowledge flowing both ways, and that the real debate is whether people still need teams.
Used in
W3C Web Machine Learning Community Group, WebMCP draft report
Security
Lets a page publish tools agents can call, with read-only and consequential hints; states that agents inherit the user's identity and session, that the hints are advisory, and leaves identity, permissions and delegation to other work.
Used in
Meunier & Major, IETF draft 2026
Security
Defines how automated clients sign HTTP requests so a site can verify which agent sent them; states it does not authenticate human users and does not define authorization or delegation.
Used in
W3C, Agentic Web Working Group draft charter, 2026
Security
Proposes a working group whose first deliverable is site capabilities for agents; agent identity and agent delegation are listed only as possible later deliverables, with no draft.