AI-Augmented Software Development

Evidence

Every source cited on this site, strongest evidence first.

"Pre-2025 models" marks studies whose models predate September 2024 (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o, Llama 3, Claude 3). "Early-2025 models" marks studies on Claude 3.5 or 3.7. Treat those findings as hypotheses to re-check, not settled results.

Randomised controlled trials

Becker et al. (METR), arXiv 2025

LoopingMeasuringReviewingUnderstandingDelivery
LoopingMeasuringReviewingUnderstandingDelivery

Early-2025 models

Experienced developers forecast they would be 24% faster with AI but were measured 19% slower (16 developers, 246 tasks on familiar repos, Claude 3.5/3.7).

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Shen & Tamkin, Anthropic 2026

Understanding
Understanding

In a vendor RCT (n=52, unreplicated), AI help gave quiz scores of 50% vs 67% (d=0.74), the biggest gap in debugging and no significant speed gain; in exploratory subgroups of 2 to 7 people, conceptual questions scored 65% or more and delegating under 40%.

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Studies

Rein (METR), Algorithmic vs. holistic evaluation, 2025

LoopingTestingMeasuringReviewingDeliverySpecification
LoopingTestingMeasuringReviewingDeliverySpecification

Early-2025 models

An agent passed 38% of maintainer test suites, but 0 of 15 reviewed PRs were mergeable, including 4 that passed every test (Claude 3.7).

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Bean et al., NeurIPS 2025

Measuring
Measuring

Of 445 LLM benchmarks, 16.0% used any statistical test or uncertainty estimate to compare models, 53.4% gave evidence that they measure what they claim, and under 10% used complete real-world tasks.

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Stanford HAI, AI Index report, 2026

MeasuringTesting
MeasuringTesting

Secondary synthesis: invalid benchmark questions ranged from 2% (MMLU Math) to 42% (GSM8K).

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Peng et al., arXiv 2023

MeasuringDelivery
MeasuringDelivery

Pre-2025 models

Developers were 55.8% faster on one greenfield task, counting only the 35 of 95 who finished; GitHub and Microsoft authors.

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Imai, ICSE 2022 poster

MeasuringTeamwork
MeasuringTeamwork

Pre-2025 models

A 20-person student poster (abstract only) found lower quality with Copilot pairing.

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Pearce et al., IEEE S&P 2022

MeasuringSecurityReviewing
MeasuringSecurityReviewing

Pre-2025 models

About 40% of completions for risky scenarios were vulnerable.

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Tabarsi et al., Empirical Software Engineering 2026

MeasuringSpecificationReviewing
MeasuringSpecificationReviewing

Pre-2025 models

Of 16 early adopters interviewed, 14 reported less mundane work and 13 saved time, yet 8 discarded most generated code and 15 modified code before using it.

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Ma et al., NeurIPS 2025

MeasuringTesting
MeasuringTesting

Solutions that passed LiveCodeBench's private tests failed on LeetCode 20% (medium) and 40% (hard) of the time.

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Lulla et al., ICSE workshop 2026

Specification
Specification

A short AGENTS.md cut median time 28.6% and output tokens 16.6% with gpt-5.2-codex; correctness was not measured.

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Shim et al., ICLR 2026

Specification
Specification

Pre-2025 models

Performance peaked well below full context, so more context can be worse (GPT-4o, Qwen 2.5).

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Paulsen, arXiv 2025

Specification
Specification

Single-author preprint

Retrieval degraded with length: most models degraded severely by 1,000 tokens.

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Galster et al., AIware 2026

Specification
Specification

In 2,853 engineered GitHub repositories, 90.6% had a context file (CLAUDE.md in 45.9% and AGENTS.md in 39.5% of those), skills and subagents were rare and mostly static text, and 301 of 497 context-file pointer pairs pointed from CLAUDE.md to AGENTS.md; this measures adoption, not benefit.

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Paltenghi & Chandra, arXiv 2026

Specification
Specification

A spec recovered from a finished session let a fresh agent rebuild the change at a mean 5.06 of 6 on 72 internal Meta tasks (5.74 after up to three refinement rounds) against 4.23 for the developer's own change description, with specs about 5.7 times shorter than the diff; LLM graders, internal data.

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Rathje et al., preprint 2026

SpecificationUnderstandingMeasuring
SpecificationUnderstandingMeasuring

Preprint, n=7,227

Users rated sycophantic bots as more objective, and 72% of real ChatGPT turns were as agreeable as the sycophantic condition.

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Kassner & Schütze, ACL 2020

Specification
Specification

Pre-2025 models

Negations prime the concept they ask the model to avoid (BERT).

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Min et al., EMNLP 2022

Specification
Specification

Pre-2025 models

Format and coverage of few-shot examples matter more than correct labels (GPT-3 era).

Read the original

Margalit et al., arXiv 2026

SpecificationSecurityUnderstanding

Kohler (NN/g), The 3 roles of context for AI agents, 2026

Specification
Specification

A qualitative study with Claude power users proposes asking whether each context item is global (rarely changes), local (one task) or ambient (raw streams).

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Moran & Gibbons (NN/g), Vibe architects, 2026

Specification
Specification

The sample behind the big-ball-of-mud observation is 7 people.

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Demirer et al., NBER 2026

ReviewingMeasuringDelivery
ReviewingMeasuringDelivery

Across 100,000+ developers, AI tools raised lines of code 17.3x and releases only 1.3x; calibrated on this data, unlimited code generation would lift releases only about 10% (a calibration, not an estimate).

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Perry et al., CCS 2023

ReviewingSecurityTestingUnderstandingMeasuring
ReviewingSecurityTestingUnderstandingMeasuring

Pre-2025 models

AI-assisted participants (n=47) wrote less secure code on 4 of 5 security tasks and were more likely to believe it was secure.

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He et al., via Ehsani et al., arXiv 2026

ReviewingMeasuringSecurityTesting
ReviewingMeasuringSecurityTesting

After Cursor adoption, static-analysis warnings rose 30% and complexity 41% (secondhand).

Read the original

Baltes et al., arXiv 2026

ReviewingSecurityMeasuringTestingTeamwork

Vicente & Matute, via Lovett, arXiv 2026

ReviewingUnderstanding
ReviewingUnderstanding

80.7% of participants spotted a flawed AI recommendation and followed it anyway.

Read the original

Councilman et al., arXiv 2025

ReviewingTesting
ReviewingTesting

With a user-confirmed formal query and a verifier, 82.9% of correct Ansible programs were accepted and 92.4% of wrong ones rejected, but 68 of 70 wrong accepts traced to queries that left details open, and the human review step was never run (authors' own 21 tasks).

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Ye, Cui & Hadfield-Menell, ICML 2026

SecuritySpecification
SecuritySpecification

Models judge who is speaking by writing style, not role tags; forged reasoning raised attack success from about 0% to 60%.

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Spracklen et al., USENIX Security 2025

Security
Security

Pre-2025 models

At least 5.2% of packages suggested by commercial models and 21.7% by open-source models didn't exist, about 45% of fake names recurred every time, and checking names against the registry is 'the illusion of verification' once an attacker registers the name.

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Krishna et al., arXiv 2025

Security
Security

Pre-2025 models

Across 11 code models, package hallucination ranged from 0.22% to 46.15% per model and language (5.42% for GPT-4o); larger, higher-scoring models invented fewer packages, a directional result driven partly by two outliers (three of four authors at NVIDIA, whose model scored best).

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Geng et al., CMC 2026

Security
Security

A review of 128 studies claims an input filter plus output validation plus model-level defences brings attack success under 5%, but the section it points to reports no measurement.

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Fucci et al., IEEE TSE 2017

TestingDelivery
TestingDelivery

In a pre-LLM study of 39 professionals, test order made no significant difference while shorter, steadier cycles went with better quality and productivity, up to 14% better quality going from 50-minute to 8-minute cycles (small-to-medium effects, adjusted R2 about 0.1).

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Alonso, arXiv 2026

TestingSpecification
TestingSpecification

On SWE-bench Verified with Qwen3-Coder 30B, a static test-impact map plus a short skill cut test-level regressions 70% (6.08% to 1.82%), while a procedural TDD prompt with no impact context raised them to 9.94%; single author, 100-125 instances, provisional.

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Mock et al., XP 2024 workshop

TestingDeliverySecurity
TestingDeliverySecurity

Pre-2025 models

A chat model in a TDD loop edited an expected value instead of fixing the bug (5 participants, one case).

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Aggarwal et al., ICML 2025

TestingLoopingSecurity
TestingLoopingSecurity

Pre-2025 models

Without critique filters, assume(false) spread to every output of a prover-graded translation loop.

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Bastani et al., PNAS 2025

Understanding
Understanding

Pre-2025 models

Among about 1,000 students, unrestricted GPT lowered exam scores by 17%, while a hint-only tutor showed no exam penalty.

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Kosmyna et al., arXiv 2025

Understanding
Understanding

Pre-2025 models

In a preprint (n=54), 83% of LLM users couldn't quote their own essay minutes later, and writers who started without AI showed higher brain connectivity once they used it than the AI-first group ever reached.

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McCurdy et al., Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 2020

Understanding
Understanding

Across 310 experiments, people recalled about 10 points more of what they generated themselves; general psychology, not AI-specific.

Read the original

Fan et al., International Journal of STEM Education 2025

UnderstandingTeamwork
UnderstandingTeamwork

Pre-2025 models

Among 234 students (self-report scales), human pairs scored significantly higher on collaboration and social presence than AI-assisted pairs or solo students.

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Brynjolfsson et al., Stanford Digital Economy Lab 2026

UnderstandingTeamwork
UnderstandingTeamwork

In a descriptive working paper, early-career jobs (ages 22-25) in AI-exposed roles were 19% below trend.

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Liu, Christian et al., COLM 2026

Understanding
Understanding

Across three experiments with 1,058 online participants, after 11 to 12 problems with a GPT-5 sidebar people tested without it solved fewer problems (d from -0.20 to -0.45) and skipped more in two of three, with the cost sitting with people who asked for direct answers; fractions and reading comprehension, not coding, and no durability data.

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Te'eni & Katz, HHAI 2026

UnderstandingSpecificationTeamwork
UnderstandingSpecificationTeamwork

In one developer's four months with Claude Code (163 episodes), decisions had to be re-explained every session and agreed rules decayed as conversations grew; it builds theory and gives no prevalence.

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Rezazadeh et al., arXiv 2025

UnderstandingSecurity
UnderstandingSecurity

In a simulation of provenance-gated shared memory, accuracy went 0.27, then 0.61 after grants, then 0.37 after revocations; the paper has no proof of policy adherence, no attack test, and nothing on stale or conflicting entries.

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Tiwari & Gupta, Discover Artificial Intelligence 2026

UnderstandingSecurity
UnderstandingSecurity

A 2026 review says the provenance-gated memory approach ensures privacy, though the primary paper shows simulation only.

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Horikawa et al., arXiv 2025

Delivery
Delivery

Across 14,998 agentic commits (89.3% Codex-authored), low-level refactors were 35.8% vs a 24.4% human baseline and architectural refactors 43.0% vs 54.9%; design-smell counts showed no practically meaningful change (Cohen's d about -0.03).

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Saba et al., Scientific Reports 2026

Delivery
Delivery

A smaller, low-rigor comparison of refactoring tools on isolated snippets found wide model-to-model variance, with no human check on correctness.

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Lyu et al., arXiv 2025

Teamwork
Teamwork

In a 39-student, one-semester study, solo-AI was the worst of three conditions and human-plus-AI scored highest, directly disagreeing with Fan et al.

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Smith, ASEE 2026

Teamwork
Teamwork

A 10-study review found, corroborated across 2 studies, that after AI-paired programming students were more likely to believe they had a complete solution and no longer needed to learn to program.

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Sun, Bai & Dredze, Findings of ACL 2026

MeasuringTesting
MeasuringTesting

Peer-reviewed study showing that knowledge requirements shape LLM responses to context-memory conflict; not tested on code.

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Shojaee et al. (Apple), arXiv 2025

Measuring
Measuring

Early-2025 models

Apple preprint, The Illusion of Thinking, on early-2025 models.

Read the original

Suoniemi, prompt-vs-metric-eval repository

TestingSpecification
TestingSpecification

Small: 18 functions, two models of one family, two smells; part of the gap is confounded

Behavioural guidance gave about 83 percent genuine fixes on both models, against 29 and 6 percent for a bare linter message; one model did worse with the bare metric than with no guidance.

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Tufano et al. (Google), SpecOps 2026

TestingSpecification
TestingSpecification

Workshop paper; one company, one model family

An agent that first wrote each unit's pre- and post-conditions caught 63.2% of 90 historical bugs within five runs against 53.4% for a plain test-writing agent (p=0.035, not significant at one or two runs), for 38% more tokens; most misses were conditions the spec left out.

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Milanese et al., arXiv 2026

TestingMeasuringDeliveryLoopingSpecification
TestingMeasuringDeliveryLoopingSpecification

Preprint; Java only

Within the same 391 Java repositories, agent PRs changed tests more often than human PRs (55.0% vs 45.8%), added tests more and modified or deleted existing tests less; pooled across repositories the gap vanished or reversed, and added test methods looked alike, mocks included.

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Hora & Robbes, MSR 2026

TestingSpecification
TestingSpecification

Across 2,168 repositories with agent configuration files, 36% of agent test commits added a mock against 26% of other test commits (small effect); many CLAUDE.md files mention tests but few say how to mock.

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Hasan et al., arXiv 2025

TestingMeasuring
TestingMeasuring

Preprint; unit-test files only

In 39 open-source agent frameworks and 439 agent applications, tests target tools and workflows; the model gets under 5% of tests, prompts about 1%, and LLM-judge checks appear in about 1% of application tests.

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Shi & Kristensson, ACM TOCHI 2026

TestingUnderstandingSpecification
TestingUnderstandingSpecification

Pre-2025 models · Students, short lab tasks

Students brainstorming tests with a chatbot took the first 8-10 suggestions and stopped, with no gain over web search; a system that proposed one new test at a time from the editor's context, accepted or rejected each time, raised branch coverage of the combined human and AI tests by about a third.

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Ardic et al., Empirical Software Engineering 2026

TestingUnderstanding
TestingUnderstanding

Pre-2025 models · 12 students

Students writing unit tests with ChatGPT split the work by who supplies the test idea and who writes the code; heavy delegators used one-shot prompts and had to fix wrong expected values by hand, and students reported lower quality, trust and ownership of generated tests.

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Hamidi et al., arXiv 2026

TestingMeasuringSpecificationDelivery
TestingMeasuringSpecificationDelivery

Preprint

LLM-written suites at full statement, branch or mutation adequacy triggered about a third of 6,066 hard bugs in LLM-written code but their assertions flagged only 1-2%; the three criteria barely differed, and assertions rewritten from the task description lifted detection by about 7 points.

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Haroon et al., arXiv 2026

TestingSpecificationDeliveryMeasuring
TestingSpecificationDeliveryMeasuring

Preprint; no control condition

After one-line behaviour changes to small programs, about 99% of regenerated tests that failed still asserted what the unchanged program did, and pass rates also fell after behaviour-preserving edits.

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Pancher et al., XP 2025

TestingLoopingDelivery
TestingLoopingDelivery

Pre-2025 models · Students; same task done twice

Students' own TDD code passed every reference test in 15 of 35 submissions against 12 when redone with ChatGPT; small iterative prompts and fixing by hand when the model stalled went with success, pasting the whole spec and refusing to touch the model's code with failure.

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Mock & Russo, Empirical Software Engineering 2026

TestingDelivery
TestingDelivery

Pre-2025 models · 16 participants; newer models only in the agent arm

With people writing tests and GPT-3.5 writing code, TDD code was no more correct than people working alone (60.8% vs 62.0% of baseline tests); an agent platform on newer models was most correct and fastest but added code no spec asked for, which tests covered less.

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Robbes et al., ACM TOSEM 2026

DeliveryMeasuringLoopingTesting
DeliveryMeasuringLoopingTesting

Coding-agent traces appeared in 22.20% (conservative) to 28.66% (high estimate) of 128,018 active GitHub repositories by February 2026; agent-assisted commits had a median of 31 added lines against 11 for human commits.

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Welter et al., ASE 2025

TeamworkUnderstanding
TeamworkUnderstanding

Pre-2025 models · 19 students; completion-only assistant

Human pairs had about twice as many knowledge-transfer exchanges as people working alone with an assistant, over more topics; alone with the assistant, 28% of knowledge was accepted on trust against 12% in pairs.

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Liu et al. (AIShellJack), arXiv 2026

SecuritySpecificationReviewing
SecuritySpecificationReviewing

Preprint, auto-run assumed, May 2025 tool versions, one run per test

A poisoned coding rule file made Cursor and GitHub Copilot with auto-run execute attacker-intended commands in up to 84% of cases (41% to 83% by editor and model on one scenario); how the developer worded the task made little difference, while how the payload was framed decided success.

Read the original

Zhu et al., EMNLP 2026

SecurityTestingSpecificationReviewing
SecurityTestingSpecificationReviewing

Exfiltration only, no human-approval modes, one run per cell

In 1,920 runs in poisoned repositories, a planted secret reached an attacker server in 45.5% of runs when the agent was asked to run tests and 8.6% when asked to fix a bug; agents warned least on the test task; security rules raised warnings but not the share of attacks that failed; Claude Code with Sonnet 4.6 was the most resistant of four agent-model setups.

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Benchmarks

Mathews & Nagappan, ASE 2024

LoopingSpecificationTestingDeliveryMeasuring

Chen et al., ICLR 2024

LoopingTesting
LoopingTesting

Pre-2025 models · Preprint

The same debugging loop gained 2-3 points with no unit tests (text-to-SQL) and up to 12 points with them (C++ to Python, Codex 80.4% to 92.5%), a bare 'the code is wrong' message gained less than execution results wherever tests existed, and it matched baselines that drew 10 times more samples.

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Madaan et al., NeurIPS 2023

LoopingTesting
LoopingTesting

Pre-2025 models · Preprint

Self-feedback improved 7 unlike tasks by about 20% absolute on average, but on math ChatGPT judged 94% of its own answers 'everything looks good' and an outside wrong-answer signal added over 5 points; partly GPT-4-judged, no equal-cost baseline.

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Shinn et al., NeurIPS 2023

LoopingTestingSpecificationDelivery
LoopingTestingSpecificationDelivery

Pre-2025 models · Preprint

With no tests, a reflection loop scored below no loop at all (0.52 vs 0.60), a small open model gained nothing (0.26 before and after), and no equal-cost baseline was reported.

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Yang et al., NeurIPS 2024

LoopingSpecificationTestingSecurity
LoopingSpecificationTestingSecurity

Pre-2025 models

Failed runs cost twice as much as successful ones and more budget rarely rescued them, while collapsing old observations and adding a lint guardrail each lifted solve rate from 15% to 18% (GPT-4 Turbo).

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Li et al. (Microsoft), arXiv 2026

LoopingTestingMeasuring
LoopingTestingMeasuring

Preprint

The best result on 112 long tasks was 25.0% resolved (Opus 4.7 in Claude Code with an outer continuation loop, 17.0% without), regressions occurred in all four loop profiles, and the same model (gpt-5.4) scored from 18.75% in Codex down to 7.14% in mini-swe-agent, with the Ralph loop at 7.84% against 24.11% for dynamic workflows; Microsoft authors, tasks built with Claude Code.

Read the original

Pan et al., ICML 2025

Looping
Looping

A verifier trained on agent runs raised SWE-bench Verified from 20.6% (one attempt) to 32.0% (best of 16), but the right patch was often produced and not picked (fine-tuned Qwen2.5-Coder-32B, late-2024 open model).

Read the original

Antoniades et al., ICLR 2025

LoopingTesting
LoopingTesting

Pre-2025 models

Tree search added 4.0 to 6.7 points on SWE-bench Lite at 5 to 14 times the cost but only 0.6 to 5.3 points at matched compute, and a value function picked the right solution 73% of the time against 84% for a debate between final candidates (GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, Llama 3.1 70B).

Read the original

Orlanski et al., arXiv 2026

LoopingTestingDeliveryReviewingMeasuring
LoopingTestingDeliveryReviewingMeasuring

Preprint

Code quality decays as agents extend their own work, and quality-aware prompts change the starting point but not the rate.

Read the original

Aleithan et al., arXiv 2024

MeasuringTesting
MeasuringTesting

Pre-2025 models

31.1% of passed SWE-bench patches were suspicious because the tests were weak (reported secondhand via TDD-Bench Verified).

Read the original

Ahmed et al. (IBM), arXiv 2024

MeasuringTestingSpecificationDelivery
MeasuringTestingSpecificationDelivery

Pre-2025 models

Cited for weak graders: it relays the SWE-Bench+ figure, and the same row reports that 44 of 500 (8.8%) SWE-bench Verified golden tests weren't fail-to-pass or covered no changed lines.

Read the original

Ye et al., ICLR 2026

MeasuringTestingSpecificationDelivery
MeasuringTestingSpecificationDelivery

Early-2025 models

Almost all code failures in this Lean 4 benchmark were compile errors (o3: 25.8 of 27.4 points), so its code score mostly measures writing Lean that compiles.

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Gloaguen et al., arXiv 2026

SpecificationUnderstandingDeliveryTeamwork
SpecificationUnderstandingDeliveryTeamwork

Preprint

LLM-generated context files lowered success slightly and raised cost 20-23%, hand-written ones gave +2.4% over no file (p=0.21) with cost up to 19%, repo overviews did not help agents find files, and tools named in a context file were used 1.6 times per task against under 0.01 otherwise, with reasoning tokens up 10-22% (GPT-5.x and Sonnet 4.5).

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Chao et al., arXiv 2026

SpecificationUnderstanding
SpecificationUnderstanding

Preprint

The best model scored 55.2% on acting on updated facts.

Read the original

Debenedetti et al., arXiv 2025

SecuritySpecificationReviewing
SecuritySpecificationReviewing

Early-2025 models

Isolating untrusted data from planning and checking each tool call against a policy blocked nearly all AgentDojo attacks, solving 77% of tasks vs 84% undefended at about 2.8x the tokens; spotlighting alone cut Claude 3.5 Sonnet's successful attacks from 44 to 5 of 949, with no guarantee and no adaptive attack tested (preprint, Google authors who also built the benchmark).

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Wang et al., arXiv 2025

Security
Security

Poisoned tool descriptions succeeded on 36.5% of test cases on average and up to 72.8% across 20 model settings, with refusals under 3%; reasoning mode raised attack success (Qwen3 32B: 58.5% vs 23.7%). Measures susceptibility, not real-world incidence, and tested no defences.

Read the original

Chen et al., arXiv 2026

TestingDeliveryLoopingReviewingMeasuring

Chen et al. (SecureVibeBench), arXiv 2026

SecurityMeasuringTesting
SecurityMeasuringTesting

Preprint, 105 C/C++ memory-safety tasks, static-analysis false alarms near 50%

On 105 real C/C++ tasks the best of 13 agent-model combinations produced 23.8% patches that were both correct and secure; in most combinations over half of correct patches still carried a security issue; two CLI agents ranked top on correctness but not on secure correctness.

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UK AISI Inspect Evals, ipi_coding_agent, 2026

SecurityReviewing
SecurityReviewing

45 samples, community-contributed, results table predates a scorer fix

On 35 injected bug-fixing tasks, injection resistance ranged from 68.6% to 97.1% across five models, newer models resisted more, and explicit detection of an injection happened about once in 140 injected samples.

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Telemetry

Medisetty (Uber), Building an efficient software factory, 2026

LoopingMeasuringSpecificationSecurity

Ars Technica, Meta's scrapped plans to go AI-native, 2026

MeasuringDelivery
MeasuringDelivery

Per an internal CTO post reported secondhand, code changes at Meta rose 220% while user-facing feature changes rose 36%.

Read the original

Orosz, Interesting AI coding stats from Cursor, 2026

MeasuringReviewingSecurity
MeasuringReviewingSecurity

One model cost about 2x another per agent request but tied per accepted line; Orosz notes Cursor gains if its own model looks cheap.

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AWS, PHP2Shell exploitation before public disclosure, 2026

Security
Security

Honeypot telemetry saw a PHP2Shell exploit attempt 4 days before disclosure, proof-of-concept exploits about 12 hours before the embargo lifted, and several actors within hours of the patch (AWS sells detection and WAF products).

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Surveys

METR, AI usage survey, 2026

LoopingMeasuring
LoopingMeasuring

2026, n=349

Median value uplift was 1.4-2x against 3x speed, and every checkable 10x claim was overstated.

Read the original

DORA, State of AI-assisted software development, 2025

LoopingMeasuringUnderstandingDeliveryTestingTeamwork

Skibba (The Guardian), Workers say they're drowning in workslop, 2026

Measuring
Measuring

WSJ survey; Liebscher press account

Reports secondhand a WSJ survey of 5,000 in which 92% of executives say AI makes them more productive and 40% of non-managers say it saves no time; its account of the Liebscher study gives 1,150 workers and 40% exposure, a discrepancy the doc calls unexplained.

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Liebscher et al., preprint 2026

MeasuringReviewingTeamwork
MeasuringReviewingTeamwork

In a self-report preprint (n=962, BetterUp and Stanford authors), 52.7% said they had sent AI work they judged low quality; 38% received some in the last month and spent 3.3-3.4 hours a month on it; 36% then wanted to avoid that colleague.

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ICONIQ, State of AI, 2026

Measuring
Measuring

Executives report about 31% time savings from coding assistance (executive self-report, n=247).

Read the original

Vendor reports

Huang et al. (Anthropic), How AI is transforming work at Anthropic, 2025

LoopingUnderstandingDeliveryTeamwork

Databricks, Managing AI coding costs at scale, 2026

LoopingMeasuringSecurity

Jain, Are harnesses worth the cost?, 2026

LoopingTesting
LoopingTesting

On one Java service scored by 178 hidden acceptance tests, a test-feedback harness took a cost-optimised model from 3 of 10 to 10 of 10 accepted at 3.9 times the tokens, while a flagship model was 10 of 10 either way at 10.5 times the tokens with the harness; the author founded the company whose tool built the harness.

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Young (Anthropic), Effective harnesses for long-running agents, 2026

Looping
Looping

Proposes a JSON feature list where only the passes field is editable to stop premature completion claims.

Read the original

Orosz, Uber's AI infra from the inside (podcast), 2026

LoopingMeasuringSpecificationReviewingTestingSecurity

Osmani et al. (Anthropic), How the Claude Code team does code review, 2026

LoopingReviewingUnderstandingTestingSecurityMeasuring
LoopingReviewingUnderstandingTestingSecurityMeasuring

The Claude Code team has the agent show test or build output, then a fresh-context subagent reviews the diff before any PR; the 'two to three times better' figure is one engineer's estimate.

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Anthropic, The advisor strategy

Looping
Looping

A cheap model consulting a strong advisor gained 2.7 points on SWE-bench Multilingual at 11.9% less cost per task.

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Yoon (PostHog), Jobs every engineer should automate with agents, 2026

Looping
Looping

A flaky-test agent checking every 3 hours filed 72 reports since July, 11 of which (about 15%) led to merged fixes, while agent-sent tool-feedback reports ran to a few thousand, too many to read; vendor self-report.

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Raghavan (Harness), The impact of GitHub Copilot on developer productivity, 2023

MeasuringDelivery
MeasuringDelivery

Pre-2025 models

A before/after study (n=50) by a vendor of engineering metrics found 10.6% more PRs with Copilot, with no quality data.

Read the original

GitHub, Does GitHub Copilot improve code quality?, 2024

Measuring
Measuring

Pre-2025 models

Unsigned vendor post with no paper: 13.6% more lines per readability error with Copilot, reviewed only by the 25 developers whose code passed every test.

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Vanagas (PostHog), This post will save you tokens, 2026

MeasuringSpecificationSecurity
MeasuringSpecificationSecurity

With no methodology given, a daily bill doubled ($5k to $10k) while cost per run fell ($1.80 to $1.40), and a cheaper model was 20% cheaper in one test, not the 2.5x its list price suggests, because it took 1.7x the turns.

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Orosz, What's the ROI of engineers' AI spending?, 2026

MeasuringReviewing
MeasuringReviewing

Vendor data shows weekly PRs up 113% and monthly PRs up 127% year on year among CodeRabbit users; interviews across 27 companies found spend from under $300 to $3,000+ per developer per month and PR change from flat to 5-10x, with one company's PR size tripling while count stayed flat.

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Raicea (PostHog), A beginner's guide to testing AI agents, 2026

MeasuringTesting
MeasuringTesting

Claims boolean LLM judges with concrete examples are reliable enough, with no agreement data, and recommends observing, curating failures into evals, sampling 5-10% of traffic and reviewing traces weekly.

Read the original

Chatterji et al. (OpenAI), How organizations use AI, 2026

MeasuringLooping
MeasuringLooping

OpenAI's own working paper on ChatGPT Enterprise says message volume measures intensity, not economic importance.

Read the original

Used in

Anthropic, The AI-native SDLC playbook, 2026

SpecificationReviewingSecurity
SpecificationReviewingSecurity

Advises planning before code and committing the plan, and says a skill makes violations rare while a hook makes them close to impossible; untested.

Read the original

LangChain, The anatomy of an agent harness, 2026

Specification
Specification

Load skill bodies only when they are used.

Read the original

Kim (System Design Newsletter), How AI agents build enterprise software, 2026

Specification
Specification

Advises splitting unknowns from assumptions in specs; vendor-sponsored, no data.

Read the original

Kim & Gencay (System Design Newsletter), How to cut your Claude Code token usage, 2026

Specification
Specification

Advises starting a new conversation when compaction fires every few messages or earlier rules are forgotten, carrying over a short hand-off summary and keeping standing rules in CLAUDE.md; sponsored, no data.

Read the original

Lopopolo (OpenAI), Harness engineering, 2026

Specification
Specification

One big instruction file failed, so the team kept a short AGENTS.md as a table of contents over structured docs and enforced rules with custom linters; unmeasured, output figures are self-estimates.

Read the original

Faros, AI engineering report, 2026

ReviewingMeasuringSecurityDeliveryLoopingTesting
ReviewingMeasuringSecurityDeliveryLoopingTesting

Correlational vendor data shows median review time up 441%, incidents per PR up 243% and unreviewed merges up 31%.

Read the original

Osmani, Agentic code review, 2026

ReviewingSecurityMeasuring
ReviewingSecurityMeasuring

Relays CodeRabbit data on 470 PRs (Dec 2025) showing 1.7x more issues and 1.5-2x more security issues in AI PRs, and an unnamed study where 93.4% of flagged locations across 146 PRs came from exactly one of four tools (secondhand).

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CircleCI, What 28 million workflows reveal, 2026

ReviewingMeasuringDeliveryLoopingTesting
ReviewingMeasuringDeliveryLoopingTesting

Main-branch success fell to 70.8%, a five-year low (no methodology given).

Read the original

Lucas et al. (Anthropic), Formal software verification with LLMs, 2026

ReviewingTestingSecurity
ReviewingTestingSecurity

Claude proved 239 OSS-Fuzz entry points crash-free with specs from existing fuzz harnesses, yet one harness asserted less than the post claims.

Read the original

Trebacz et al. (OpenAI), Verifying code at scale, 2025

Reviewing
Reviewing

OpenAI says its Codex reviewer caught more critical issues with fewer false alarms once given repository access and execution, that 52.7% of its comments led to a code change across over 100k PRs a day, and that recall fell faster on model-written code (figures not reproduced).

Read the original

Durnas (Aikido), What is slopsquatting?, 2026

Security
Security

A squatted fake package name got 30,000+ downloads in three months (Lasso), and one spread to 237 repos through LLM-generated agent skills.

Read the original

Aikido, SafeChain

Security
Security

A wrapper around npm, npx, yarn and pnpm that checks installs against a malware feed.

Read the original

OpenAI, Coordinated disclosure of critical vulnerabilities, 2026

Security
Security

Says its model found the flaws before attackers, 'to our knowledge'; the AWS telemetry undercuts that head start.

Read the original

Yan & Dattani (Anthropic), Using LLMs to secure source code, 2026

SecurityTesting
SecurityTesting

Anthropic's scanning had disclosed 1,596 vulnerabilities, 97 known patched, as of 2026-05-22; one team's 40% false-positive rate came from findings with working proofs of concept that owners judged outside their threat model.

Read the original

GitHub, Security validation for third-party coding agents, 2026

SecurityReviewing
SecurityReviewing

GitHub runs CodeQL, advisory-database checks on new dependencies and secret scanning on third-party agent code by default, and claims hundreds of leaks and vulnerabilities prevented, unquantified.

Read the original

Tablan et al., arXiv 2025

Understanding
Understanding

In a vendor preprint, a shared memory raised LLM-judged code quality most for small models, 4.23 to 4.89 on a 5-point scale; the memory was seeded from the benchmark's own reference answers and no execution tests were reported.

Read the original

Letta, Benchmarking AI agent memory, 2026

Understanding
Understanding

Letta says an agent using a plain filesystem scored 74.0% on the LoCoMo chat-recall benchmark with GPT-4o mini, against 68.5% reported for Mem0's graph variant.

Read the original

Chhikara et al. (Mem0), arXiv 2025

Understanding
Understanding

Mem0's own preprint scores full context at 72.90 and Mem0 at 66.88 on a judge metric; the benchmark tests conversation recall, not coding.

Read the original

Suprmind, AI hallucination rates, 2026

Measuring
Measuring

Vendor aggregator of AI hallucination rates, secondhand.

Read the original

Liao, Agents don't need memory, 2026

UnderstandingSpecification
UnderstandingSpecification

The maker's own tool, no measurement

Argues agent memory should be a maintained Markdown brain that the agent reads before and updates after each task, not snippets retrieved from a vector store; he still trims it by hand.

Read the original

Anthropic, The components of agent memory, 2026

SpecificationUnderstandingLooping
SpecificationUnderstandingLooping

Vendor's own product concept, single runs, small question sets

A second pass that checked memory notes against session logs corrected a wrong note and changed one run's outcome; a linked knowledge base beat search alone only when search was kept beside it (61% against 53% of graded criteria, on its own 48%), and one grew larger than its source documents; several agents writing one shared page lost 16 of 57 facts until each had its own page; telling models to record only failures cut their memory gains.

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Token Security (The Hacker News), We built an agent that broke all of our security rules, 2026

Security
Security

Vendor-supplied, sells agent identity security

A browser agent inside a user's signed-in session has the user's full access, and the app cannot tell its actions from the user's; the vendor says agent lanes must carry the agent's identity, a verifiable link to the person, and a scope narrower than the person's, and that current drafts each carry only one.

Read the original

Google, Gemini in Chrome auto browse help

Security
Security

Chrome's auto browse agent uses the user's signed-in sites, is limited to sites relevant to the task, asks before sensitive sites and consequential actions, and marks pages it visited in history; nothing tells the visited site an agent is driving.

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Microsoft, New in Edge for Business: AI for work, safe from day one, 2026

Security
Security

Limited preview

Edge for Business agentic browsing is off unless enabled by policy, runs only on sites IT designates, pauses before passwords and card numbers, and keeps signed-in sites signed in through the user's cookies.

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Practitioner reports

Farr, The Ralph playbook, 2026

LoopingSecurity
LoopingSecurity

Permission-bypass flags leave the sandbox as the only boundary.

Read the original

Cooper, Coding agents and driving in gears, 2026

LoopingReviewing
LoopingReviewing

Proposes stopping after each test when unsure, running several tasks when sure, and keeping auth and payments in low gear; untested.

Read the original

Osmani, Software factories, 2026

Looping
Looping

Heuristics that agents hold up for 3-10 steps and drift past 20, and that a loop earns unattended running with a cheap, frequent, hard-to-fake check.

Read the original

Huntley, Ralph Wiggum as a software engineer, 2025

LoopingTesting
LoopingTesting

Advises resetting context every loop and using a single validation agent for cleaner signal.

Read the original

Luu, Programming language and token efficiency, 2026

LoopingMeasuringTesting

Augmented Coding Patterns, Patterns catalog

LoopingSpecificationReviewingSecurityUnderstandingDelivery

Dex (HumanLayer), Why software factories fail, 2026

LoopingReviewingSpecificationDelivery

Böckeler, Maintainability sensors for coding agents, 2026

LoopingTestingSpecificationMeasuring

Fornasier, Getting out of the loop, 2026

LoopingMeasuringUnderstandingReviewing

Karpathy, Dwarkesh Podcast 2025

LoopingSpecificationMeasuringTesting
LoopingSpecificationMeasuringTesting

Agents were not net useful for novel, precisely arranged code, pushing standard patterns, defensive bloat and deprecated APIs, but helped with boilerplate and a tested port to an unfamiliar language (n=1).

Read the original

Böckeler, Experiences with local models for coding, 2026

Looping
Looping

A locally run 35B mixture-of-experts model handled scripts and small well-specified changes but fell apart on complex logic, and one task failed 5 of 7 automated reruns on one machine (two tasks, one evaluator).

Read the original

Green (Forbes), AI costs more than the people it replaced, 2026

MeasuringLooping
MeasuringLooping

Reports secondhand that Amazon withdrew an internal usage leaderboard after staff gamed it.

Read the original

Ludic, AI mania is eviscerating global decision-making, 2026

MeasuringLooping
MeasuringLooping

Anonymous testimony that engineers under quotas ran self-prompting loops and none was caught.

Read the original

Bharade (Business Insider), Uber's COO on justifying AI token spend, 2026

Measuring
Measuring

Reports that Duolingo dropped AI usage from performance reviews.

Read the original

Majors (Honeycomb), AI norms and values part 3, 2026

MeasuringReviewingTeamwork
MeasuringReviewingTeamwork

A CTO describes an unmeasured company policy: say what an artifact is, why you send it and how much review you want.

Read the original

Pinecoder, My old job feels very distant now, 2026

MeasuringReviewingUnderstandingSecurity
MeasuringReviewingUnderstandingSecurity

One engineer reports about 3x merged PRs after a model upgrade, with method and baseline not shown (personal essay, n=1).

Read the original

Augmented Coding Patterns, Selective hearing obstacle

Specification
Specification

Rules that fight the model's training silently revert.

Read the original

Böckeler, Understanding spec-driven development, 2025

Specification
Specification

A spec tool turned a small bug into 4 user stories and 16 acceptance criteria, and reviewing many verbose spec files was worse than reviewing code (one evaluator, 2025).

Read the original

Orosz, What is happening with code reviews?, 2026

ReviewingSecuritySpecificationTeamwork
ReviewingSecuritySpecificationTeamwork

GitHub PR volume rose about 5x in three years, and a 5-person team routing risky changes to humans and the rest to AI review went from 80 to 154 PRs per week (self-reported).

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Orosz, Concern about code review load, 2026

Reviewing
Reviewing

Uber filters AI review comments by confidence and merges duplicates.

Read the original

Mikhin & Turner (Evil Martians), 10 anti-AI-slop moves, 2026

ReviewingTestingMeasuring
ReviewingTestingMeasuring

Recommends phasing deterministic gates: baseline, then warnings on changed files, then blocking.

Read the original

Tornhill, Controlling the uncertainty machine, 2026

ReviewingSpecification
ReviewingSpecification

Bug fixes get light inspection and novel features deeper structural review, never full line-by-line reading; each review finding becomes an agent skill (his company sells code-health tooling).

Read the original

OWASP, LLM01 Prompt injection, 2025

SecuritySpecification
SecuritySpecification

OWASP says it is unclear if there are fool-proof methods of prevention; RAG and fine-tuning don't fully mitigate it, and detecting injected text is an open problem.

Read the original

OWASP community, MCP tool poisoning

Security
Security

A malicious MCP server's tool responses carry instructions the agent follows; tools are reviewed at connect time but responses are trusted at runtime (no incidence data).

Read the original

OWASP, LLM02 Sensitive information disclosure, 2025

Security
Security

The OWASP category the tab maps the lethal trifecta and credential exposure to.

Read the original

OWASP, LLM06 Excessive agency, 2025

Security
Security

Root causes are excessive functionality, permissions and autonomy; logging and rate limits limit damage but don't prevent it.

Read the original

OWASP, LLM07 System prompt leakage, 2025

Security
Security

System prompts should be treated as extractable.

Read the original

OWASP, LLM08 Vector and embedding weaknesses, 2025

Security
Security

Embeddings can be inverted to recover text, shared stores leak across permission boundaries, and indexed documents can carry hidden instructions.

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OWASP, LLM04 Data and model poisoning, 2025

Security
Security

Tampered models, LoRA adapters and poisoned data; backdoors can lie dormant.

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OWASP, LLM09 Misinformation, 2025

SecurityReviewingUnderstanding
SecurityReviewingUnderstanding

The OWASP category, including overreliance, that the tab maps slopsquatting, insecure code and skill loss to.

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OWASP, LLM03 Supply chain, 2025

Security
Security

Covers tampered models and packages; vendors can change terms to train on customer data.

Read the original

OWASP, A03 Software supply chain failures, 2025

Security
Security

The web Top 10 category the tab cites for agent-picked dependencies.

Read the original

OWASP, Software supply chain security cheat sheet

Security
Security

Recommends SBOMs, signed sources, pinned registries and egress controls on fetches.

Read the original

OWASP, LLM05 Improper output handling, 2025

Security
Security

Model output is passed to shells, SQL or browsers without validation; a coding agent's shell tool does this by design.

Read the original

OWASP, LLM10 Unbounded consumption, 2025

SecurityMeasuring
SecurityMeasuring

Pay-per-use pricing can be exploited; OWASP favours rate limits, quotas, timeouts and iteration caps.

Read the original

Böckeler, TDD inside the agent loop, 2026

TestingLoopingDeliverySpecification
TestingLoopingDeliverySpecification

An agent (Sonnet 4.6) running TDD alone on a clear spec reached the same correctness and mutation score at 3x to 8.5x the tokens, and in every TDD run skipped RED, over-implemented or wrote tautological tests (5 batches, LLM judge, small experiment).

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bdfinst, TDD vs. non-TDD in agentic development, 2026

TestingDeliveryLooping
TestingDeliveryLooping

Across 18 tasks, measured cost showed a 'cost advantage of test-after' of -9%, -55% and -8% by task size, baseline not stated.

Read the original

Tornhill, Practices I abandoned with agents, 2026

TestingReviewingSecurity
TestingReviewingSecurity

Testimony that agent-drafted, human-reviewed end-to-end tests are where the bulk of agentic gains came from, and that agents deleted tests or changed them to match wrong code.

Read the original

Vaccari, Acceptance tests for AI-assisted development, 2025

TestingDeliveryReviewing
TestingDeliveryReviewing

Recommends acceptance tests through in-memory adapters, converging independently on the approved-scenarios idea.

Read the original

Beck, Pragmatic Engineer podcast 2025

TestingDeliverySecurity
TestingDeliverySecurity

Calls TDD a 'superpower' against agent regressions, reports agents deleting or changing tests, and recalls a Facebook feature where TDD was a waste of time because the bugs that hurt were cross-subsystem (anecdote).

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Beck, Augmented coding: beyond the vibes, 2025

TestingDelivery
TestingDelivery

Human-enforced TDD with an agent took two failed attempts to calibrate.

Read the original

Ördög (Augmented Coding Patterns), Approved scenarios

TestingReviewing
TestingReviewing

Proposes approved scenarios and constrained test DSLs as hard-to-fake test formats.

Read the original

Spati, Obsidian vault to enterprise company brain, 2026

UnderstandingSecurity
UnderstandingSecurity

A blog with a demo, unmeasured, describes a design that blocks a conflicting memory write until a human decides.

Read the original

Litt, Understanding is the new bottleneck, 2026

UnderstandingReviewing
UnderstandingReviewing

Proposes a 5-question quiz on a change before shipping it.

Read the original

Würsch, AI doesn't replace engineering discipline, 2026

UnderstandingReviewing
UnderstandingReviewing

Proposes a comprehension commit gate for juniors.

Read the original

antirez, Writing system software: code comments, 2018

Understanding
Understanding

Cited for writing the message yourself as the ownership check.

Read the original

goblindegook, The wastes of product engineering, 2023

UnderstandingTeamworkDelivery

James, How to go fast, 2019

UnderstandingTeamwork

Spati, Nobody knows anything anymore, 2026

UnderstandingTeamwork
UnderstandingTeamwork

A growing note built on one anonymous account argues the bigger risk is whole teams no longer knowing the architecture or why choices were made.

Read the original

Stannard, Software hyper-delivery, 2026

UnderstandingReviewing
UnderstandingReviewing

On one bug fix (n=1), reading the diff, running the tests and questioning the agent was judging, not understanding; only re-implementing the fix gave understanding.

Read the original

Karpathy, Making LLM outputs easier to understand (X post), 2026

Understanding
Understanding

Claims, without evidence, that a ladder of output formats from controlled English to diagrams, HTML pages and explainer videos makes oversight easier; the author is a former AI-education founder, an interest the post does not disclose.

Read the original

Edwards-Alexander, The economic benefit of refactoring, 2026

Delivery
Delivery

Splitting a large file cut tokens per change 83%; the agent couldn't choose refactorings unaided (n=1).

Read the original

Nakashima (Honeycomb), AI norms and values part 2, 2026

ReviewingTeamwork
ReviewingTeamwork

Stated goals, not measured results

Sets a target of 25% of PRs reviewed by AI and auto-merged without human review by the end of 2026, at a change failure rate under 3%, and admits a related goal is already off track.

Read the original

Abitbol (Revolut), AI Engineer NYC 2026

LoopingMeasuring
LoopingMeasuring

Self-reported; the productivity chart does not separate the model change from other causes

A bank reports that strict budget limits made engineers ration tokens, and that self-hosting an open model for about 2,000 engineers cut its invoice to about a tenth and let them stop rationing; it gives no quality or full-cost figures.

Read the original

Bache, Agentic AI coding breaks mob programming, 2026

SpecificationUnderstandingTeamwork
SpecificationUnderstandingTeamwork

One coach's experience, no measurement

Agents break mob programming's timed rotation, intention-only talking and quiet-or-chaotic screen watching; she uses silent shared prompt writing, running commentary, reading the summary aloud and a retro that names the patterns used.

Read the original

Böckeler, tdd-comparisons repository

TestingSpecificationLoopingDelivery
TestingSpecificationLoopingDelivery

Two runs per condition; analysis written with an LLM

The test-first prompt had no test-list step and told the agent not to design up front; one improved prompt produced both the best and the fourth-best of four runs.

Read the original

Bache with Ördög, How to stop AI from ruining your codebase, 2026

TestingSpecification
TestingSpecification

The tool author's own account

Agents split a function only to satisfy a length limit; a hook that turns the linter's output into a short prompt saying what the smell means and how to fix it gave better refactors in the demo.

Read the original

Bache with Selander, The most important AI coding advice you haven't heard, 2026

TestingSpecificationSecurity
TestingSpecificationSecurity

The tool author's self-report, no measured outcome

Telling an agent to follow TDD failed because it skipped steps and over-implemented, so he blocks violations with hooks outside the prompt; he still reads every change.

Read the original

Newton-King (Microsoft), Inside the LLM call, 2026

MeasuringLoopingTesting
MeasuringLoopingTesting

Tutorial from the standard's own project

Shows coding assistants exporting OpenTelemetry traces with model, token counts, latency and tool calls; prompt content is captured only when switched on.

Read the original

Liu (IBM) & Solomon (Google), AI agent observability, 2025

MeasuringTestingLooping
MeasuringTestingLooping

Standards roadmap

Describes OpenTelemetry's draft conventions for agent telemetry and argues traces should feed evaluation as well as monitoring.

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Laycock (Thoughtworks), Why are good developers so wary of agentic development?, 2026

DeliveryUnderstandingTestingLoopingReviewing
DeliveryUnderstandingTestingLoopingReviewing

One internal exercise, participants' own estimates

In a week where agents wrote all the code, participants estimated about two thirds of their time went on the whiteboard and one third on the harness, yet the build was often red; the author argues that built is not the same as working in production.

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Edwards-Alexander (Thoughtworks), An accidental blackboard, 2026

LoopingTeamworkSpecificationUnderstanding
LoopingTeamworkSpecificationUnderstanding

One exercise, accidental and not reproduced

With agents sharing a numbered spec and keeping plans in the repo, they began using the plans to claim work and hand off notes; frequent pushes overloaded CI so the team backed off, and the author wants the channel kept outside source control.

Read the original

Luu, We should be more ambitious with the software we build, 2026

DeliveryUnderstandingMeasuring
DeliveryUnderstandingMeasuring

Self-reported, low-review post

Reports building a tunable regex engine, a faster ripgrep fork and a Rust build speed-up in low single-digit hours each, and argues people skip such projects out of a pre-agent cost model; includes Kreinin's rebuttal that most people lack pass/fail checks and should aim smaller.

Read the original

Kunal, Resisting cognitive surrender, 2026

UnderstandingReviewingSecurityDelivery
UnderstandingReviewingSecurityDelivery

One practitioner's experience

Reports that relying on agents made his systems more complex and his understanding of them thinner, and sets a per-project limit on what to hand over, with held-out validation, observability, shadow traffic and fast reverts for work he does delegate.

Read the original

Essays and opinion

Willison, The lethal trifecta for AI agents, 2025

LoopingSecurityReviewing
LoopingSecurityReviewing

About 15 vendor products whose agents combined private data, untrusted input and an outbound channel were exploited in 2023-2025.

Read the original

Angelo (Fortune), Uber burned through its 2026 AI budget, 2026

LoopingSecurityMeasuring
LoopingSecurityMeasuring

Uber used its whole 2026 AI-coding budget in four months after a usage leaderboard.

Read the original

Zechner, Thoughts on slowing down, 2026

LoopingDeliverySpecification

Emanuel, The overprompting trap, 2026

LoopingSpecification
LoopingSpecification

Uses a plan-then-execute split but insists on an overpowered executor; opinion.

Read the original

Morris, Humans and agents in software engineering loops, 2026

Looping
Looping

Humans work 'on the loop', changing the specs, checks and guidance that steer the agent rather than the artefact when results are wrong; conceptual, no data.

Read the original

Anderson, Models and agents are outpacing their interfaces, 2026

Measuring
Measuring

Newsletter forecast with no data: steering people to cheaper models can raise retries and human correction and erase the saving.

Read the original

Ewerlöf, Coding is not solved, 2026

MeasuringReviewingUnderstandingSecurity

Bean, Strauss & Singh (HBR), Performance management needs new metrics, 2026

Measuring
Measuring

Prescriptive: keep separate scorecards for human, agent and combined system.

Read the original

Odell, The great agent skills land grab, 2026

Specification
Specification

Skills should carry novel information or code.

Read the original

Piskala, arXiv 2026

Specification
Specification

Preprint guide

Keep the spec in sync with code through tests for long-lived systems, use the least rigour that removes ambiguity, and skip specs for exploratory work; no data, and its 'up to 50%' error cut is secondhand and unverified.

Read the original

Ewerlöf, AI systems engineering patterns, 2025

Specification
Specification

Proposes loading the whole working set into context instead of retrieving chunks (CAG) for full recall; no data, partly drafted with Gemini.

Read the original

Kohler (NN/g), The new big ball of mud, 2026

Specification
Specification

Without sorting context by role, nontechnical builders' agent systems grow as big balls of mud.

Read the original

Foote & Yoder, Big ball of mud, 1997

Specification
Specification

Origin of the term 'big ball of mud', which the authors call a pattern, not an antipattern.

Read the original

Perez (NN/g), Context architecture, 2026

Specification
Specification

Position paper arguing for information architecture for context; argued, not measured.

Read the original

Fowler, The spec can come later, 2026

Specification
Specification

Argues for hacking until something works, recovering a spec from the session and regenerating to see what the spec kept; a first spec is always wrong and regenerating a bug keeps the bug.

Read the original

Gonzalez, A sufficiently detailed spec is code, 2026

Specification
Specification

A spec detailed enough to generate software is thinly veiled code, so specs are not cheaper than code; its evidence is one author, one spec, one Claude Code run.

Read the original

Marin-Perez, The mythical well-defined project, 2026

Specification
Specification

Most projects are well defined but poorly specified, so agents can run free only where any decent output will do; no data, author sells consultancy and training.

Read the original

Brasil, When I reject AI code even if it works, 2026

ReviewingUnderstanding
ReviewingUnderstanding

Rejects green code the author cannot explain.

Read the original

Tanna, Why I still hand-write my commit messages, 2026

ReviewingUnderstanding

Lawson, You can just choose how many bugs you want now, 2026

Reviewing
Reviewing

Without a simplification pass, each bug gets its own patch.

Read the original

Luu, Notes on agentic coding, 2026

ReviewingTesting
ReviewingTesting

Proposes QA and fuzzing instead of default diff review.

Read the original

Cervera, Vibe everything, 2026

ReviewingSecurityTeamwork
ReviewingSecurityTeamwork

A human in the loop whose only acceptable answer is approval is there to take the blame, without the knowledge, time or authority to stop a failure (opinion, no data).

Read the original

Ellens, The system is on the other side of the glass, 2026

ReviewingUnderstandingTesting
ReviewingUnderstandingTesting

Generated tests and AI reviewers each add an interpretation between the engineer and the running system, and AI quality gates turn those interpretations into decisions (no data).

Read the original

Mollick, An opinionated guide to which AI to use, 2026

Security
Security

Approve anything that sends, spends or deletes.

Read the original

Times of Israel, AI-flagged cargo (relaying CNN), 2026

Security
Security

Relays a CNN exclusive that an intelligence report partly produced with AI nearly led to an armed boarding of a ship; unnamed sources, no official confirmation.

Read the original

Orosz, Time to rethink software security, 2026

Security
Security

Infers that AI drives faster exploitation and the October 2026 incident cluster (opinion with incident relays).

Read the original

AI Made Tools, Test-driven development with AI, 2026

Testing
Testing

Proposes a human writes plain-language test intent, AI expands it into test code, a human implements the production code and AI only refactors after (unbylined, low confidence).

Read the original

Bainbridge, Automatica 1983

Understanding
Understanding

Automation research prescribes regular manual control to keep operator skills; it comes from industrial automation, not LLMs.

Read the original

Yu et al., arXiv 2026

UnderstandingSecurity
UnderstandingSecurity

A position paper names the gap of when one agent's memory write must become visible to another, but measures nothing.

Read the original

Storey, Cognitive debt, 2026

UnderstandingReviewingLooping
UnderstandingReviewingLooping

Argues at least one human should fully understand each AI change, and that teams should record why, not what.

Read the original

Storey, What I'm hearing about cognitive debt, 2026

Understanding
Understanding

Argues docs are not sufficient if they are not living artifacts.

Read the original

Ronacher, The tower keeps rising, 2026

UnderstandingTeamwork
UnderstandingTeamwork

Argues agents remove the friction that synchronised people.

Read the original

Sahai, We're gonna need a lot more mathematicians, 2026

UnderstandingTeamwork
UnderstandingTeamwork

Essay with a hypothetical example, arguing for more funding of the author's own field: at society scale, understanding must sit outside whoever proposes the system.

Read the original

Atwood, Rubber duck problem solving, 2012

UnderstandingReviewing
UnderstandingReviewing

A 2012 essay with anecdotes argues explaining to a listener that cannot answer finds the gap.

Read the original

Kaya, The Feynman technique, 2026

UnderstandingReviewing
UnderstandingReviewing

Popular guide with no cited studies to writing a plain-words explanation for a novice.

Read the original

Parrish (Farnam Street), The Feynman technique, 2012

UnderstandingReviewing
UnderstandingReviewing

Popular guide with no cited studies to writing a plain-words explanation for a novice; its steps differ from other guides.

Read the original

Feynman, Knowing versus understanding (lecture excerpt), 2012

UnderstandingReviewing
UnderstandingReviewing

Physics, not code: two equivalent descriptions suggest different next changes, so being able to propose a change is a sharper test of understanding.

Read the original

James, The weight of AI on engineers, 2026

DeliveryTeamwork
DeliveryTeamwork

Pairing with an agent is closer to reading someone's diff; freed time should go left of dev, to users and stakeholders.

Read the original

Kenny & Pogrebna (HBR), AI is changing how customers choose your business, 2026

Delivery
Delivery

Describes cohort releases within a week.

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Laforgia, The Agile Manifesto has lost relevance, 2026

DeliveryMeasuring
DeliveryMeasuring

When building is cheap, deciding what not to build is the skill.

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Faler, AI and the illusion of velocity, 2026

DeliveryMeasuring
DeliveryMeasuring

Overproduction is Lean's worst waste.

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Tornhill, Compressed cognition, 2026

Delivery
Delivery

Agents compress a day of decisions into one session.

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Yegge, The AI vampire, 2026

Delivery
Delivery

Argues for 3-4 hour workdays with agents.

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Boag (Smashing Magazine), Is your organization messing up AI adoption?, 2026

DeliveryTeamwork
DeliveryTeamwork

Opinion, no data, about knowledge work in general (the author sells AI training): treat AI adoption as change management, start with enthusiasts, make failure safe, replace pages of rules with a few principles, and learn from shadow AI instead of banning it.

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Orosz with Majors, Stop being skeptical about AI for development, 2026

ReviewingTeamwork
ReviewingTeamwork

Secondhand summary of a podcast

Majors argues code review is the least valuable part of what humans add, that trust should move from authorship to tests and evals, and that engineers will ship code they never read.

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James, We learned this lesson already, 2026

SpecificationTestingDelivery
SpecificationTestingDelivery

Argues that exhaustive upfront specification is waterfall in disguise and that spec-driven development repeats it: what to build is discovered by building.

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Goedecke, In defense of not understanding your codebase, 2026

Understanding
Understanding

Argues that partial, even wrong, understanding is the normal working state on large, high-turnover codebases, and that LLMs are one of many ordinary things that get in the way of it.

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Farley, The industry is catching up, 2026

TestingSpecificationDeliveryReviewing
TestingSpecificationDeliveryReviewing

Sells a course on this; most cited voices are secondhand

Argues that when a machine writes the code, the human's job is an executable acceptance-test specification in four layers, written one scenario at a time, kept out of the agent's reach and approved by a person.

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Grove, The new code, 2025

SpecificationTestingDelivery
SpecificationTestingDelivery

Argument by analogy, no measurements; written by an OpenAI employee

Argues that code is a lossy projection of the specification, so teams should write and keep the spec, make it executable and test against it.

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Bache, The last year has changed everything I knew about TDD, 2026

TestingDeliveryLoopingSpecification
TestingDeliveryLoopingSpecification

Advocate's critique, no new data

Argues that the study finding no gain from TDD in the agent loop used a thin prompt (no test list, weak refactoring, no smell sensors), so the question is still open.

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Bache, It doesn't help to push AI into a crappy process, 2026

DeliveryTestingMeasuringSpecification
DeliveryTestingMeasuringSpecification

Observation and anecdote, no measurement

Says AI hung on a code-first process closes tickets faster but leaves the same weak tests and design, and describes the test-list, small-slice loop that experienced TDD practitioners use with agents.

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van den Berg, The Mythical Man-Month in the age of AI, 2026

LoopingTeamworkUnderstanding
LoopingTeamworkUnderstanding

Short opinion post, no data

Argues Brooks's Law still holds with agents: sequential work stays sequential, the overhead moves to defining done and stitching work together, and more agents on unclear requirements give the wrong answer faster.

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Griffith, Do we need code review anymore in 2026?, 2026

ReviewingTeamworkUnderstanding
ReviewingTeamworkUnderstanding

Opinion, no data

Argues review's lasting value is the shared question of why a change exists, with knowledge flowing both ways, and that the real debate is whether people still need teams.

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W3C Web Machine Learning Community Group, WebMCP draft report

Security
Security

Draft, not on the Standards Track

Lets a page publish tools agents can call, with read-only and consequential hints; states that agents inherit the user's identity and session, that the hints are advisory, and leaves identity, permissions and delegation to other work.

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Meunier & Major, IETF draft 2026

Security
Security

Working group draft

Defines how automated clients sign HTTP requests so a site can verify which agent sent them; states it does not authenticate human users and does not define authorization or delegation.

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W3C, Agentic Web Working Group draft charter, 2026

Security
Security

Proposed charter

Proposes a working group whose first deliverable is site capabilities for agents; agent identity and agent delegation are listed only as possible later deliverables, with no draft.

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